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ABSTRACT
PROTECTING PRIVACY AND ENSURING SECURITY OF RFID SYSTEMS USING
PRIVATE AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOLS

Md. Endadul Hoque
Marquette University, 2010

Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) systems have been studied as an emerging
technology for automatic identification of objects and assets in various applications ranging from
inventory tracking to point of sale applications and from healthcare applications to e-passport.
The expansion of RFID technology, however, gives rise to severe security and privacy concerns.
To ensure the widespread deployment of this technology, the security and privacy threats must be
addressed. However, providing solutions to the security and privacy threats has been a challenge
due to extremely inadequate resources of typical RFID tags. Authentication protocols can be a
possible solution to secure RFID communications.
In this thesis, we consider RFID authentication protocols based on symmetric key
cryptography. We identify the security and privacy requirements for an RFID system. We present
four protocols in this thesis. First, we propose a lightweight authentication protocol for typical
tags that can perform symmetric key operations. This protocol makes use of pseudo random
number generators (PRNG) and one way hash functions to ensure the security and privacy
requirements of RFID systems. Second, we define the desynchronizing attack and describe the
vulnerabilities of this attack in RFID systems. We propose a robust authentication protocol that
can prevent the desynchronizing attack. This protocol can recover the disabled tags that are
desynchronized with the reader because of this attack. Third, we introduce a novel authentication
protocol based on elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) to avoid the counterfeiting problem of RFID
systems. This protocol is appropriate for the RFID tags that can perform the operations of ECC.
Finally, to address the tradeoff between scalability and privacy of RFID systems, we propose an
efficient anonymous authentication protocol. We characterize the privacy of RFID systems and
prove that our protocol preserves the privacy of RFID tags and achieves better scalability as well.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) is identified as emerging technology that is
utilized by various applications to automatically identify objects such as objects and/or assets.
The main benefits of RFID systems are that they can provide automated contactless identification
of a range of physical entities. Usually, an RFID tag is a wireless transponder. Information stored
on a tag can be read by special transceivers called RFID readers without requiring line-of-sight.
The first known application of RFID was the “friend or foe” identification system used in
fighter planes in World War II [Royal40]. After a few decades, RFID technology gains the
attention because of its inherent capability of being used as a replacement for bar codes in supply
chain and inventory management [Juels06]. Nowadays, because of its low cost and ease of use,
RFID technology has become widespread, including in point of sale applications [Juels06],
product tracking in supply chain management [Juels06, Kerschbaum09], automated fare
collection in public transportation [Garfinkel05], animal tracking to child supervision, healthcare
applications [Juels06].
1.1

Overview of an RFID system
An RFID system has three major components: RFID tags, RFID readers and a backend

server. We now briefly describe each of these components.
RFID tags: An RFID tag is an identification device which usually has an identifier and
which transmits data wirelessly using radio frequency (RF) in response to interrogation by an
RFID reader. A tag is a tiny chip which consists of an antenna and an integrated circuit. This IC is
used for storage, signal modulation, and signal demodulation. The antenna is used for the
communication with readers via radio frequency. When a tag receives a specific radio signal, it
automatically transmits a reply. An RFID tag is shown in Figure 1.1.
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Depending on the power supply, tags are categorized into three types: passive, active and
semi-passive tags. Passive tags have no power source on board. They draw power from an RF
signal sent by the readers. Therefore, in the absence of a reader, they cannot communicate, not
even compute. The second type is active tags which have on board power source. They do not
have to rely on the readers (or on other devices) for computation and communication with the
readers. Semi-passive tags are the combination of both the active and passive RFID technology.
They have their own power source for only computation purpose, not for communication. They
rely on the RF signals sent by the readers to send or receive data.

Figure 1.1: An RFID tag (source: http://www.barcode-solutions.com)

Depending on the processing capability, RFID tags can be categorized in two types:
dumb and smart. Dumb tags have no significant processing power expect the communication
capability for which they rely on the readers’ RF signal. They contain fixed length unique
identifiers which they reply in response to interrogation by readers. Even their memory capacity
is fairly small – from few hundred bytes to maximum 2kBytes [Laurie07]. On the other hand,
smart tags have on board processers that can capable of performing cryptographic operations
[Laurie07]. Their memory capacity is much larger than that of dumb tags. They usually have
32kBytes or more memory [Laurie07]. They are capable of performing authentication before
sending the stored data.
RFID readers: An RFID reader is a transceiver that interrogates and read data from tags.
A reader uses its antenna to broadcast an RF signal which is used to start the interrogation.
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Typically readers are connected to a backend server which has a database of tag information.
Readers forward responses of tags to the backend server for further processing. An RFID reader
is shown in Figure 1.2.

Figure 1.2: An RFID reader (source: http://www.barcode-solutions.com)

Backend server: A backend server is equipped with a database of tag information. It can
retrieve the detailed information of a tag by using the tag’s response as a key. Depending on the
applications, the communication can be started by the backend server or by readers. Usually,
when the backend server wants to identify one or more tags, a reader broadcasts an RF signal.
Any tag within the range of the signal responds to the reader. The reader forwards the tag’s
response to the backend server. Then the backend server processes the response to identify the
tag. If the server identifies the tag successfully, it can retrieve the detailed information of the tag.
Figure 1.3 shows a typical RFID system.
Tag

Backend server

Reader
…1011...

Secured channel
channels

Unsecured channels

Figure 1.3: An RFID system
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1.2

Motivation
The expansion of RFID technology is limited because it gives rise to serious security and

privacy concerns, such as eavesdropping, cloning, impersonations, and tracking of end users.
Since a reader and a tag communicate via a wireless radio communication channels, their
interactions are susceptible to eavesdropping and/or manipulation. If a tag replies its unique
identifier to authenticate itself to the reader, this fixed response becomes a signature of the tag
which opens the possibility of being tracked. Thus the privacy of the tag holder can be invaded.
So these security and privacy issues must be addressed before the widespread deployment of
RFID tags.
Conventional security primitives cannot be integrated in RFID tags since they have
inadequate computation capabilities with extremely limited resources. That is why research
community devote themselves in search of appropriate solutions that will ensure RFID privacy
and security without compromising the cost. Authentication can be one approach to address such
security and privacy threats. An RFID system can use a tag authentication scheme in which a tag
can be identified and verified by the backend server without disclosing the tag’s identifier to the
eavesdropper. In addition, authentication also ensures that only authorized reader can access a
tag. Since tags are under heavy threats of adversaries, it is also mandatory to make sure that the
tag’s reply is accurate.
Public key cryptography is infeasible for the current RFID tags because of their limited
resources. However, the current tags can perform symmetric key cryptography such as hash
functions and symmetric encryption algorithms. So far various authentication protocols to address
the security and privacy threats in RFID system by using symmetric key cryptography have been
proposed in literature. We discuss some relevant protocols in the chapter 2 but they all have some
limitations in terms privacy, security and/or performance. This motivates us to develop new
authentication protocols that can perform better as well as address the security and privacy
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challenges. In this thesis, we focus on the solutions to the security and privacy threats at the
protocol level, though some hardware based solutions have been proposed to ensure the security
of RFID systems.
1.3

Main contributions
The main contributions of this thesis are as follows:
1. We identify the security and privacy requirements for an RFID system.
2. Our contributions include the assessment of some prior authentication protocols
against the identified security and privacy requirements.
3. We present a lightweight authentication protocol for typical RFID tags that can
perform symmetric key cryptography such as hash functions. This protocol
addresses the identified security and privacy requirements.
4. We define desynchronizing attack and propose a robust authentication protocol
that supports recovery against this attack. We analyze this protocol against the
identified security and privacy requirements for an RFID system.
5. We introduce a novel authentication protocol based on Elliptic Curve
Cryptography (ECC) to avoid the counterfeiting problem in RFID systems. This
protocol is appropriate for an RFID system where tags are capable of performing
the operations of elliptic curve cryptography.
6. Finally, we characterize the privacy of RFID systems. We present an efficient
anonymous authentication protocol that addresses the tradeoff between
scalability and privacy of RFID systems. This protocol improves the scalability
of an RFID system. However, it not only prevents the security attacks but also
preserves the privacy of tags. In fact, we prove that our protocol preserves the
privacy of RFID tags.
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1.4

Thesis Organization
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows:
1. In chapter 2, we present the security and privacy requirements for an RFID
system along with the assessment of some prior works against the identified
requirements.
2. We present our lightweight authentication protocol in chapter 3. In addition to
the protocol description, we describe an attack model and analyze the protocol
with respect to this attack model.
3. In chapter 4, we define the desynchronizing attack and describe how this attack
can disable tags so that the tags cannot be identified by the valid reader in future.
We propose a robust authentication protocol that not only recovers the RFID
system from this disabled state to the normal operating state but also supports the
identified security and privacy requirements.
4. In chapter 5, we introduce an ECC based authentication protocol for RFID
systems where tags can perform ECC based operations. We present the security
and privacy analysis of the protocol with respect to a proposed attack model.
5. In chapter 6, we propose an efficient anonymous authentication protocol as a
solution to the tradeoff between the scalability and privacy problem of RFID
systems. We define the characteristics of RFID privacy. Based on this notion of
RFID privacy, we prove that our protocol protects privacy of RFID tags and
thereby the privacy of tag holders.
6. Finally in chapter 7 we summarize the contributions of the thesis and present
some future research directions.

1.5

Publications
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Some materials of this thesis have been published in [Ahamed08A, Ahamed08B,
Hoque09A, and Hoque09B]. The protocol of chapter 3 has been first published in [Ahamed08A].
A extended version of this work can be found in [Hoque09A]. The contents of [Hoque09B] form
the basis of chapter 4. The protocol of chapter 5 can be found in [Ahamed08B].

8

Chapter 2: Related Work
To design a solution to security and privacy threats, the goals or requirements need to be
identified. In this chapter, we first present our identified security and privacy requirements for an
RFID system. Then we assess some prior works against the identified requirements. Though a
considerable volume of papers have been published so far, here we present some prior works that
are quite relevant to our proposals.
2.1

Security and privacy requirements for an RFID system
Several real life applications of RFID systems require them to be secure and protective

against security and privacy related attacks. Considering those applications and analyzing their
security requirements, we identify the following security and privacy goals for an RFID system.
A safety ring composed of all these security and privacy goals is depicted in Figure 2.1. An RFID
system ensuring all the six elements of this safety ring is considered to be secured and protected
against all major attacks. The elements of the safety ring are explained in the following.
1) Protect Privacy: RFID technology raises privacy concerns in some situations. For
example, consumer privacy is invaded when the use of RFID enables unauthorized parties to
obtain personally identifiable information, including location information of the tag holder. So it
should be guaranteed that a tag or its secret data cannot be distinguished without tampering it.
2) Prevent Tracking: Consumer community never wants to be tracked. Therefore,
preventing tracking is another major goal of authentication protocol. If an adversary does not
have any identifiable information of a tag, then she cannot track the tag. But if a tag replies with a
constant response each time it is queried, then it becomes a signature of the tag. As a result, this
signature allows the adversary to track the tag. So it should be ensured by the protocol that a tag
neither reveals its unique identifier nor replies with a constant response.
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Figure 2.1: Six elements of the “Safety Ring”

3) Deal with Denial of Service (DoS) attack: DoS attack means that an entity is
prevented from accessing its authorized entities. Therefore, the availability of an RFID system
mainly depends on the assurance of this goal. An RFID system should continue running and
provide service to its authorized uusers
sers even if an adversary launches DoS attack. Since it is not
possible to detect all kinds of DoS attack, authentication protocols should at least provide a way
to deal with them. Protocols should be able to take measure against vulnerable actions
action of the
adversaries
ersaries and recover the system that is under the DoS attacks.
4) Ensure Forward Secrecy: Forward secrecy means that if an adversary compromises a
tag and learns the secret key shared between the tag and the reader, she will be unable to identify
the previous responses originated from the tag. In order to maintain the security of RFID systems,
forward secrecy should be ensured by authentication protocol.
5) Lessen susceptibility to replay attack: An adversary can launch a replay attack by just
replying a message that she eavesdrops from an earlier authentication session between a reader
and a tag. Under this attack, the adversary can fool the reader as well as the tag. She can
impersonate the tag by replying the tag’s response to the reader. An aauthentication
ation protocol must
ensure that an attacker cannot impersonate a legitimate tag by just replaying an eavesdropped
message.
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6) Prevent Cloning: One important application of RFID systems is to detect counterfeit
products. In order to avoid counterfeiting, RFID tags need to be designed in such a way that an
adversary cannot clone the tags. Since this is a hardware based solution to the cloning attack, we
are interested in the solutions to attacks at the protocol level. The adversary can clone a tag if she
knows the secret key shared by the tag with the authorized reader. So, to be secured against
cloning attack, protocols should never reveal the shared secret key.
2.2

Relevant authentication protocols
We categorized the prior works in two classes: symmetric key based schemes and public

key based schemes. Although some schemes focus on providing the security solutions integrated
in basic RFID tags (e.g., blocker tags [Juels03], RFID Guardian [Rieback05]), here we consider
only the protocol level solutions.
2.2.1 Symmetric key schemes in RFID
In this subsection, we describe the most significant symmetric-key protocols proposed for
RFID security and privacy.
Deterministic hash locks protocol. Weis et al. [Weis03] first proposed a
cryptographically controlled access for RFID systems using hash locks. This scheme controls
access to a tag by locking or unlocking the tag using a one way hash function ℎ. Each tag stores
an identifier and the hash value of a secret key. A tag replies with the hash value in response to a
reader’s query. The valid reader can look up the secret key of the tag in a database of key-hash
pairs. The valid reader proves itself by sending the tag’s secret key so that the tag can verifies the
key using the hash function by comparing with the stored hash value. Finally, the tag releases its
data if the correct key is given by the reader. This protocol can protect the actual data on the tag,
but the static hash value would still be traceable.
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Randomized hash locks protocol. To address the problem of the deterministic hash
locks protocol, Weis et al. [Weis03] proposed randomized hash locks protocol, a modified
version of the above protocol. This protocol makes use of a nonce1 to introduce randomness in
tags’ responses. A tag generates a nonce  and sends the pair (, ℎ( ∥ )) to the server each
time the tag is queried. This protocol addresses the traceability problem, but prompts the reader to
brute-force its inventory for any  that matches the given hash if concatenated with . In
addition, this protocol is susceptible to replay attack, where an adversary can reply with the tag’s
response that she learned by eavesdropping in an earlier authentication session. The reader
accepts this replay response as legitimate.
Improved Randomized hash locks protocol. Juels and Weis [Juels07] proposed an
improved randomized hash locks protocol for RFID systems that protects the privacy of RFID
tags as well as prevent replay attack. In this protocol, the server generates a nonce  and queries
the tag with this nonce. The tag produces another nonce  and sends the pair ( , ℎ( ∥  ∥
 )) as the response. Therefore the server has to perform a linear search in the database for any
 that matches the given hash if concatenated with  and  . This protocol offers strong tag
privacy in front of eavesdroppers. However, the limitation of this protocol is poor scalability.
OSK protocol. Ohkubo et al. [Ohkubo03] proposed an RFID privacy protection scheme
designed to protect against tracking and provide forward security2. The protocol makes use of
hash-chains. The server stores a secret key

and a identifier  for each tag  . The tag 

. The tag replies with a hash value of the key ℎ ( ) to the

initially stores the secret key

as

server and updates the key as

← ℎ ( ). The server then identifies the tag via an exhaustive



search, computing ℎ ℎ   for each tag in the database until it finds a match with ℎ ( ),


where ℎ means the  iterations of the function ℎ . This protocol is susceptible to replay attack
1

Nonce is a random or pseudo random number that never repeats its value.
Forward security means that if an adversary compromises a tag, she will not able to trace back the entire
history of the tag’s responses.

2
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where an adversary can impersonate a tag with knowing the secret key. In addition, this protocol
also has the scalability problem.
Dimitriou protocol. Dimitriou [Dimitriou05] proposed a mutual authentication of both
tags and the server. The general idea is that the server updates a tag’s identifier if the tag proves
its identity to the server and the tag updates its own identifier only when the server proves its
validity to the tag. Thus this protocol keeps both the server and the tag always in perfect
synchronization. Though this protocol protection against tag cloning, it is subject to tracking and
denial-of-service attack. The response of the tag is static between two valid sessions, and thus it
makes the system susceptible to tracking. In addition, if the server’s response (that the server
sends to the tag to prove its validity) does not reach the tag in a session, the tag becomes
desynchronized with the server.
Molnar-Wagner protocol. A tree based protocol first proposed by Molnar and Wagner
[Molnar04] reduces the reader’s complexity from linear search to logarithmic search. This is a
tree based approach where keys are arranged in tree and tags are assigned to the leaves. Instead of
a single secret key, each tag stores a series of keys along the path of the tree from the root to the
leaf assigned to the tag. After receiving a challenge from the server, the tag replies its response
using all its keys. The server, then, finds the tree from the root to the leaves to verify whether the
tag has a valid key at each level of the tree. According to this scheme, the server needs (log  )
operations to identify a tag, where  is the number of tags in the system and  is the branching
factor of the key tree. Though this scheme provides scalability, however, it sacrifices some
privacy of tags when any tag is compromised by the adversary.
YA-TRAP protocol. A trivial RFID tag identification protocol proposed by Tsudik
[Tsudik06] uses timestamps to improve scalability and provide protection against tracking. The
server queries a tag with the current timestamp ( ′). The tag replies a random number if   ≤ 
or   > " , where  is the timestamp stored on the tag and " is the maximum possible
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timestamp. If the server is valid, the server’s timestamp would be  ≤   < " . Upon receiving a
query from the valid server, the tag updates its  ←  ′ and replies with a keyed hash value
$% ( ), where  is the unique secret key of the tag. The server then identifies the tag by finding
the response in its lookup table. This protocol needs (1) operations to identify a tag and thereby
improves scalability. However, this scheme is susceptible to denial-of-service attack.
HB+-protocol. To lower the requirements of cryptographic functions for RFID tags, Juels
and Weis [Juels05] proposed a lightweight authentication protocol based on the famous humanto-computer authentication, Hopper and Blum (HB) protocol. This simple symmetric
authentication protocol requires low-cost implementation. The hardness of this protocol is same
as the Learning Parity with Noise (LPN) problem. However, this protocol is vulnerable to an
active attack like message manipulation.
Tan-Sheng-Li protocol. The server of an RFID system can become a single point-offailure if the server is compromised by an adversary. A serverless protocol first proposed by Tan
et al. [Tan07] removes the vulnerability of a single point-of-failure in RFID systems. In this
protocol, the reader, instead of the server, maintains a list of secret information of the tags that the
reader has access to. Contrary, each tag has a secret . The tag shares this secret information with
no one of the system, not even with the reader. However, both the reader and the tag know
$(, ), where  is reader identifier and $(∙,∙) is a hash function. In response to the query from the
reader, tag replies with some of the bits of ℎ($(, ) ∥ ) ∥ ) )), where ) and ) are two
random numbers generated by the reader and the tag, respectively and ℎ(. ) is a one way hash
function. Along with the response, the tag queries the reader with a question string. Only the
legitimate reader can reply with the valid answer string which proves the reader’s legitimacy to
the tag. The tag releases its data after checking that the reader is valid. But this protocol suffers
because of poor scalability. Even the protocol 2 [Tan07] is not completely anonymous as the tag
replies with some bits of its identifier.
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2.2.2 Public key schemes in RFID
Public key cryptography is not feasible because of the inadequate computation and
storage complexity of RFID tags. Typical RFID tags are not capable of performing the expensive
operations of public key cryptography. On the other hand, strong privacy must be achieved before
the widespread deployment of RFID systems. Public key cryptography seems to the best solution
to protect consumer privacy. Therefore, a lot of works has been done to analyze and adapt the
public key protocols for RFID systems. In [Tuyls06], the author proposed that the Elliptic Curve
Cryptography (ECC) can be implemented on RFID tags using less than 5000 gates. The
feasibility of ECC implementation on RFID tags is also proposed in [Wolkerstorfer05, Hein09].
These public key cryptography based techniques for identification are mainly based on Elliptic
Curves Discrete Logarithmic Problem (ECDLP) [Okamoto92]. Some of the significant protocols
for RFID systems based on public key cryptography are proposed in [Batina06A, Batina06B,
Bringer08, Deursen09, Lee08A, Lee08B, and Lee09]. We will not describe these protocols here,
since our focus is on the symmetric key protocols for RFID security and privacy.
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Chapter 3: A Lightweight Serverless RFID Authentication
Protocol
3.1

Introduction
So far all the security and privacy requirements of RFID systems were ensured by central

databases. This server based model has drawn much consideration and some of the outcomes are
reflected in [Avoine05, Burmester06, Conti07, Cui07, Seo06A, Seo07B, Tsudik06 and Vajda03].
According to the fundamental architecture of an RFID system, a reader scans a tag and relays the
information to the backend server. Other than the back end database, no other component of this
system (not even a reader) is able to infer any information from the tag’s response since it is
encrypted. The server returns an acknowledgement (sometimes the tag’s data) to the reader only
after verifying both the tag and the reader. Typically only the central server can authenticate the
involved tag and the reader. In the server based system the central server indeed plays an essential
role of checking the validity of the tag and the reader, which is very important for privacy
protection and security issues. Consequently a malicious reader could hardly obtain precious
information from the tags of this server based system.
The major drawback of such system is that the readers always have to be connected to the
server, which limits usage of RFID systems in remote locations where the connectivity with the
server cannot always be ensured. Besides, having a single database makes the whole system more
vulnerable to privacy attacks. Having the knowledge of all tag secrets and tag information, the
central server becomes a single point-of-failure. As a result, if the server is captured by an
adversary, privacy of the entire user community is jeopardized. Therefore a serverless RFID
system is proposed in [Tan07] addressing the shortcomings of the server based system. Tan et al.
paper introduces an RFID system to the world where a gigantic central server is not a single
point-of-failure anymore.
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An alternative solution, but analogous to the central server system, is to transfer the
information of the tags from the central server to the reader that has access to these tags. In such
serverless system, a reader has to identify legitimate tags all by itself because of the absence of
server. At the same time, in order to receive the tag’s data the reader has to prove himself as
legitimate to the tag. But because of the mobile nature of the readers, they can be stolen like tags.
An adversary with a stolen reader can have access to all the information of the tags that the stolen
reader has access to. This information may include the ID and the tag secret number of the tags.
Any single pair can be loaded into a blank tag by the adversary. This fake tag can now
impersonate the legitimate tag and as a result a valid reader cannot distinguish between these two
tags. This is a severe breach in the security of an RFID system.
Existing solutions cannot be applied to the security problem of the RFID systems because
of the limited resources of the tags. Due to the lack of security, the use of RFID technology has
been restricted to a closed set of pervasive applications. However, the number of applications will
be increased if secure serverless systems are introduced. One of the major advantages of the
serverless RFID system is that it reduces the cost of system deployment in large application areas.
On the other hand, to ensure security and privacy of the system, lightweight solutions are required
because of the resource limitation of the tags. In this chapter we propose a lightweight
authentication protocol that can provide security and privacy protection similar to the central
server model without having persistent connection with the server. A version of this protocol has
been presented in [Ahamed08A, Hoque09A].
3.2

System architecture
The RFID system generally consists of tags, the reader, and the backend server.

However, ours is a serverless system. The serverless RFID system primarily consists of two
entities the reader and a set of tags. A certification authority is involved in the system to certify
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the readers and authorize them to particular tags. Next we discuss components of an RFID
system.
Tag: Each tag  is comprised of an IC chip and an antenna. The tag sends information to
the RFID reader in response through wireless medium. We focus on passive tags which are
expected to be the most common type of RFID tags. In our system, each tag is able to
communicate with one reader at a time.
Reader: A reader R is a device that sends some query using the radio frequency signal to
a tag, receives the response from the tag, and performs some important computation on those
responses.
Certification authority: The certification authority +, is a trusted party that plays the
crucial role during the deployment. +, initializes each tag by writing the tag secret into the tag’s
memory. Moreover the certification authority certifies each reader in the system and authorizes
each reader’s access to a particular set of tags. The communication channel between the reader
and the tag is assumed to be vulnerable to several attacks. However, the channel between the
reader and the +, is assumed to be secure.
3.3

The lightweight authentication protocol

3.3.1 Notations and assumptions
All the notations of this protocol are presented in Table 3.1. Each tag and each reader
have the knowledge of two functions -(. ) and ℎ(. ). The function -(. ) is a fairly simple random
number generator that can be implemented at low cost. -(. ) takes a seed as an argument and
outputs a pseudorandom number according to its distribution. ℎ(. ) is used by all the readers and
the tags to generate the next seed of the pseudorandom number generator by passing the current
seed as input. ℎ(. ) is an irreversible one way hash function. Therefore a current seed cannot be
linked with the previous one.
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Table 3.1: Notations for the lightweight authentication protocol

Symbol
.

-(. )
ℎ(. )

ℒ
/1

221
221 34
5
,

Meaning
/ th reader of the system
th tag of the system
Pseudo random number generator
One way hash function
the identifier of the / th reader
the contact list of .
the identifier of the th tag
the secret of the th tag
. receives this seed from +, for 
 receives this seed for the . from +,
the adversary

A reader . has a unique identifier  and a contact list ℒ . . obtains  and ℒ from the
+, during the system deployment. On the other hand, the +, initializes each tag  with a unique
identifier /1 and a unique secret  by writing in his nonvolatile memory. The contact list ℒ
contains information about the tags that . has access to. If . is authorized to access a set of
tags, say  ,· · ·, 7 , ℒ becomes,
ℒ = 9< 221 , /1 > |/1 = identi@ier of  and 221 = next seed of  and 1 ≤  ≤ )F.
In other words,
ℒ = G< 221 , /1 >, … , < 2217 , /17 >I.
Now we discuss the seed mentioned above. Each tag  contains only one seed for the
one authorized reader . . While the tag  is deployed by the +,,  receives 22134 = ℎ ∥  
from the +, where ℎ(. ) is one way hash function and ∥ represents concatenation.  stores the
22134 in the tag’s nonvolatile memory. On the other hand, the reader . receives the contact list
ℒ during the deployment where 221 = ℎ ∥  , ∀ ∈ [1, )]. The reader . uses these seeds to
communicate with the tags. Note that . does not know the tag secret  . The reader only knows
the outcome of the function ℎ ∥   as 221 . Since the initial 221 is computed by the +,,
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the reader . can never learn  from the received 221 . We also assume that +, cannot be
compromised by any adversary. In this chapter we denote an adversary by ,5.
(1)
(2)

. →  :

∶

2PQ2 , R)1
TUVUWXYU R)1

. ←  ∶
.
∶

) , R)1
ZUY ) = R)1
^_W each < 221" , /1" > ∈ ℒ
set )" = -  221" ⊕ R)1 ∥ R)1 
if ( )" == ) ) then
set = ℎ(( 221" )
set ) = -( )
set 221" = ℎ(( )
break
end if
end for
. →  ∶ )

(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)
(16)
(17)
(18)
(19)
(20)
(21)



∶

ZUY ) = - [ 22134 ⊕ R)1 ∥ R)1 ]

set  = ℎ  22134 
set R = -(())
if (R == ) ) then
22134 = ℎ()
else
.2R12 / )` RQℎ`/a21
 / / R) R1b2 Rc

Figure 3.1: The lightweight authentication protocol

3.3.2 Protocol description
The protocol is shown in Figure 3.1. At the beginning, the reader . transmits a 2PQ2 
and a random number R)1 to the tag  . Upon the reception of the 2PQ2  and the R)1 , 
generates a random number R)1 and computes ) = - [ 22134 ⊕ R)1 ∥ R)1 ]. To
prove own legitimacy, the tag replies with ) and R)1 . Now the reader has to verify the
legitimacy of the tag. The reader calculates )" = -  221" ⊕ R)1 ∥ R)1  for each
< 221" , /1" > ∈ ℒ and searches for a match between the received ) and the produced )" . If
the reader finds a match, the reader becomes sure about the validity of the tag. Since it is a mutual
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authentication, the reader has to prove itself to the queried tag. After identifying the tag, the
reader will produce a pseudo random number () ) after generating the next seed from the seed of
the particular tag using the hash function and will update the new seed after hashing the current
seed (produced to compute ) ) using the same function. If the reader fails to find a match, it
generates a random number () = R)1 ) and concludes  is a fake tag. Then, the reader replies
) to the tag. To verify the validity of the reader, the tag produces a pseudo random number (R)
after generating the next seed from its current seed 221 34 . If the tag finds a match between R and
) , the tag also updates its own seed using the same hash function and concludes . as the
authorized reader. Otherwise,  decides that the reader is not an authorized one or this is an
adversary. In this protocol, both the reader and the tag update their seeds after they confirm the
validity of the opposite party.
3.3.3 Interaction diagram
Figure 3.2 shows a detailed interaction diagram of our authentication protocol where the
reader . is communicating with the tag  .
3.4

Attack model
The major goal of an adversary in any RFID system is to counterfeit a real tag such that

the fake tag can only be distinguished from the real one with a small probability. As a result, the
fake tag (the fake product as well) will be identified as a legitimate one. In this chapter, an
adversary is denoted as ,5. This adversary can control a number of readers and tags. Each reader
and tag controlled by the adversary are denoted as .d and d, respectively. .d is unauthorized to
have access to any real tags as this adversarial reader fails to prove own identity to the +,.
Similarly, d is not valid since it has no idea about the seed and the tag secret. We presume that
the certification authority cannot be compromised. Otherwise, the adversary would get total
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control over all the tags. We also assume that all the entities such as tags, readers, adversaries,
adversarial tags and adversarial readers have polynomially bounded resources.
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Step 3: Upon receiving qk , the reader computes next pseudorandom number using hiij∗ ⊕ (ysqjm ∥ ysqjk )
for each tag in vm and compares with qk
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Step 4: Reader finds a match with qk for tag nk . Then reader transmits qm and finally stores the updated seed, denoted as bold
hiijk , in its contact list. Thus reader authenticates nk
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Step 5: Upon receiving qm , nk generates next pseudorandom number s from its sequence and finds a match
with qm . Thus tag verifies reader lm . Finally nk updates its seed which is denoted as bold hiijnk

Figure 3.2: Detail interactions of the authentication protocol between the reader lm and the tag nk
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Our assumption includes that ,5 is more powerful than a passive attacker. Like a passive
attacker, she can eavesdrop on the both the channels between a valid reader and a valid tag.
However, like an active attacker, ,5 can install a rouge reader .d that can communicate with a valid
tag. In addition, the adversary can also install a fake tag d to communicate with a legitimate
reader. In both cases, the ultimate goal of the adversary is to counterfeit a tag with the learned
information. In addition to these attacks, ,5 can launch hardware based physical attacks, while
these hardware based physical attacks are beyond the scope of this chapter. We will address the
attacks on the protocol layer.
3.5

Analysis of the protocol
We analyze our protocol in two steps. First we present the security and privacy analysis

followed by the cost analysis.
3.5.1 Security and privacy analysis
In this subsection, we analyze our proposed authentication protocol against different
types of attacks. For every attack, we first describe how the attack is launched by an adversary.
Then we explain how our protocol protects the system against the attack. . and  are referred to
as a legitimate reader and tag.
Privacy protection: If an adversary ,5 comes across any private information of the tag by
querying it, she may cause several vulnerabilities to the owner’s day to day life. We assume that
,5 may target a list of tags and attack each tag for a fixed number of times. ,5 queries the tags to
discover the /1 of the tag and thereby some private information of the product or the tag owner.
But our protocol strongly protects user privacy because a tag never sends its own /1 to anyone,
not even to the authorized reader. Each tag sends its reply in disguise so that only an authorized
reader can identify the tag. Moreover, no one is able to infer or learn the /1 of the tag by simply
looking at the tag’s responses or by simply querying the tag. Under this attack, the adversary has
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a list of targeted RFID tags. The adversary queries each tag within the group to determine which
tags of her list exist within this group. According to our protocol, each time a reader queries a tag
 , it replies to the reader with a new response - [ 22134 ⊕ R)1 ∥ R)1 ]. Therefore ,5 fails
to link any two responses and thereby fails to identify which one of the tags is replying. Thus our
protocol protects the privacy of the tag.
Tracking: The adversary ,5 tries to track  over time. ,5 succeeds if she is able to
distinguish  from other tags. Under this attack, ,5 repeatedly queries  with a value which
yields a consistent reply. This consistent reply becomes a signature of  . To launch this attack, ,5
can reuse the same R)1 learned from any previous session of our protocol. By incorporating
R)1 , our protocol becomes secured against tracking since ,5 cannot predict R)1 ahead of
time. Consequently,  will reply a new pseudo random number each time it is queried. Moreover,
when ,5 learns the R)1 from any previous successful authentication session, 22134 has been
updated to a new value. Thus, ,5 fails to get any consistent reply from  . As a result, she cannot
track  afterwards.
Cloning: Under this attack, ,5 queries  and places the response in a fake tag. Let this
fake tag be  . Now, ,5 wants to pass off the forged tag as legitimate and she becomes successful
if she can fool a legitimate reader . . According to our protocol, whenever the adversary queries
 , she receives a different response each time because of R)1 and R)1 . Now, if ,5 places this
response in  , she will never be able to fool a valid . . When  is queried by . ,  cannot
generate the actual response.  fails because for each query, . transmits a new R)1 that ,5
cannot predict at the time of producing the fake tag. On the other hand, since  does not know the
current seed stored on  , the fake tag cannot generate the actual response while queried by . .
Denial of Service (DoS): In this attack, ,5 does not want to derive any information or
impersonate the reader or the tag. The main target of the adversary is to ensure that a reader
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cannot access its authorized tags. To launch a DoS attack, ,5 places many requests to the backend
server so that the readers are unable to communicate with the backend server. This problem
becomes severe when the backend database shares a secret key with the tag that has to be
synchronized after each successful authentication. Our protocol eliminates the need of a backend
server. So, synchronization between the server and the tag is not required any more. Moreover, in
our scheme, a reader communicates with the backend server only at the time of deployment.
Physical attack: Physical attack means ,5 can compromise either a tag or a reader. We
will consider both the cases.
 compromises lm : When ,5 compromises a reader . , the adversary will know the
A. 
reader’s contact list ℒ and the id  . She can now impersonate . and prove herself to  , if the
reader has been authorized to access  . Eventually, she is able to access the tags  ,  , … , 7 , if
. has access to these tags. Now, the security goal is to prevent ,5 from using this knowledge to
create any counterfeit tag. Let  resides in the contact list ℒ , and ,5 wishes to counterfeit the tag
 which we name  . The adversary will be successful if  can fool another legitimate reader
. . But under our scheme, only one reader is authorized to access  and that reader is . . So, 
cannot fool . by learning 221 and /1 from ℒ .
 compromises n : In this case, the adversary compromises a tag  . ,5 is able to
B. 
create a fake tag  that can fool an honest reader . . We want to prevent ,5 from counterfeiting
another valid tag that can fool . . Since the adversary has compromised  , we assume that the
adversary knows all the private information of  . With this information, ,5 wants to clone a valid
tag  . With this cloned tag, ,5 wants to spoof an honest reader . that is authorized to access  .
Since each RFID tag shares a seed with its authorized reader,  shares a different seed with
. which is not known to  . Though ,5 knows 22134 , however, she cannot derive the shared
seed between . and  . Therefore, the adversary cannot create the fake tag to fool . .
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Eavesdropping: ,5 eavesdrops the communication between . and  and later uses this
information to launch any of the attacks mentioned above. ,5 can learn every information
exchanged between . and  such as R)1 , ) , R)1 and ) . We assume that ,5 can listen to
both the tag-to-reader and reader-to-tag communication channels. According to our protocol, ,5
cannot launch privacy attack as the protocol does not reveal any sort of private information of the
tag and the reader. Even ,5 fails to track  , because the tag replies with a new pseudo random
number every time it is queried. Thus, ,5 cannot figure out any signature to follow  .
Under our protocol, listening over the communication channels cannot help ,5 to launch a
cloning attack. ,5 cannot create a fake tag  by learning only the pseudo random numbers
exchanged between . and  . Since ,5 cannot predict R)1 and have no idea about 22134 , it is
impossible for ,5 to clone  . As a result, she cannot fool a legitimate reader . . Suppose, ,5 tries
to impersonate the tag  and we name the fake tag  . This fake tag wants to fool an honest
reader . with which  has communicated recently. Now,  will not be able to deceive . , since
  . And  fails to generate - [ 2213 ⊕
the reader will definitely query with a new R)1
4
  ∥ R)1  because it has no idea about the 2213 . Even  fails to launch a replay
 R)1
4
attack. If  replays with the same response - [ 22134 ⊕ R)1 ∥ R)1 ] that is learned from
an earlier authentication session, . will easily identify that it is a fake tag.
Forward secrecy: Forward secrecy means if anyhow an adversary compromises a tag,
she will not be able to track down any data previously transmitted by the tag. It means that if ,5
physically tampers  and learns 22134 shared with . , ,5 will not be able to trace the data back
through past events in which both the reader and the tag were involved. Our protocol ensures
strong forward secrecy since the seed-update function ℎ(. ) is an irreversible one way hash
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function. Therefore, by tampering  , ,5 cannot realize the former outputs based on the former
seeds since she cannot derive the previous seeds in the sequence from the current seed.
3.5.2 Cost analysis
Our authentication protocol involves one hash function, ℎ(. ) and one pseudo random
function -(∙). But the cost depends on the number of execution of the hash function during an
authentication session between the reader and the tag. Therefore, we determine the cost of our
protocol on the basis of the computations of ℎ(∙). From the authentication protocol described in
section 3.3.2, the tag performs the ℎ(∙) twice, first in line 12 and second in line 15. So, the cost
for our protocols is little higher than the protocols described in [Juels07, Tsudik06, and Weis03]
which require the tag to perform only one hash function. The additional hash function allows our
protocol to be serverless and yet avoids exposing the tag’s secret to the reader. In terms of
efficiency, in the worst case, the reader needs to perform |ℒ | computations, since it has to derive
-  221" ⊕ R)1 ∥ R)1  for each tag " in the contact list. Now, we consider the
communication cost. Assuming that both reader and the tag ids are of the same length, the
authentication protocol requires the communication of (2 ∙ |)| + 2 ∙ |R)1|) bits, where |)| is
the length of random numbers ) and ) , and |R)1| is the length of both the R)1 and the
R)1 respectively.
3.6

Additional features

3.6.1 Ownership transfer
Ownership transfer ensures that an authorized reader renounces the authority of a tag and
a new reader gets the authority to access the tag. Suppose, . is the current owner of the tag  .
After transferring ownership to another reader . ,  responds to . in the same way as it did to
. . From now on, . has no rights to access  . Though ownership transfer issue is dealt with in
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[Cui07, Tsudik07 and Molnar05], the backend server plays a significant role in those protocols.
Based on our protocol, we propose two methods of ownership transfer.
A. o based ownership transfer: The certification authority (+,) has all the
responsibility of deploying tags and authorizing readers. A reader obtains its contact list ℒ from
the +, using a secure channel at the beginning of its operation. Whenever the reader . faces the
need to transfer the ownership of a particular tag to another reader, it informs the +, about the
change in the access policy along with the ownership information of the tag. Ownership
information comprises the identifier and the current seed for the particular tag stored in the
contact list of . . The +, now authenticates the new owner (another reader) and authorizes the
new owner by updating its contact list with the ownership information. Then the certification
authority also deletes the ownership information of the tag from the old owner's contact list. For
example, the /1 and the current 221 of the tag  are its ownership information. The old owner
. transmits this ownership information to the +, at the time of informing about a change in
ownership of  . CA authorizes . (new owner) with this ownership information and removes
this information from ℒ .
B. Serverless ownership transfer: The prerequisite of this method is reader-to-reader
secure communication. At the time of the ownership transfer, the old owner . transmits the /1
and the current 221 of the tag  to the new owner . and then simply removes ownership
information for  from its contact list ℒ . However, the old reader can abuse the situation by
deciding not to delete 221 from his contact list. Therefore, to protect against such vulnerability,
the new authorized owner . authenticates the tag  as soon as . receives the ownership
information. This will desynchronize the seed shared between  and the old owner. Therefore,
even if . does not remove ownership information for  , . will have no valid seed to access 
thereafter. However, the shared seed between . and  will still be synchronized. Once the
ownership transfer process is completed, the new owner . notifies the +, regarding the update
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in its new contact list to remain synchronized with the +,. This notification is done through a
secure channel.
3.6.2 Scalability
Scalability means that a reader can find a tag’s identifier with limited computational time
regardless of the number of tags owned by it. According to our protocol, if the total number of
tags owned by a reader is , the time complexity of search operation is (). Juels and Weis
proved in [Juels07] that improved randomized hash lock offer strong privacy and security at the
cost of poor scalability. We entirely comply with their observation and propose a more practical
way of ensuring scalability with the help of ownership transfer. Our proposal is that each reader
will have a threshold value . Here  is the maximum number of tags that a reader can have
access to and  ≤ . When a reader’s contact list surpasses the threshold , the reader, called as
a overloaded reader, wishes to reduce its burden. So, if the overloaded reader has a co-operative
reader in its vicinity and if the co-operative reader has enough available memory space, the
overloaded reader will transfer some of its burden to the co-operative reader.
3.7

Comparison with other protocols
In this section we compare our protocol with some renowned RFID authentication

protocols. This comparison is based on the security and privacy properties required for an RFID
system. The comparison is shown in Table 3.2.
3.8

Application scenarios
A. Container recognition in off-site location: Let us consider a case in which a company

uses RFID system for employee identification, human authentication while entering into safety
regions, document management, product maintenance and etc. All these services are easily
ensured with central server based RFID system. But this company faces problem when they have
to collect their ordered raw material containers from other companies that belong to the off-site
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Table 3.2: Comparison of authentication protocols based on the security features and other
additional features
Protocols
Seo-Lee-Kim
[Seo06A]
Seo-Lee-Kim
[Seo06B]
OSK [Ohkubo03]
YA-TRAP
[Tsudik06]
AvOech[Avoine05]
RIPP-FS [Conti07]
Tan-Sheng-Li
[Tan07]
Our Protocol

Privacy
Protection

AntiTracking

AntiCloning

Synchronization

DoS
Resiliency

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes
Yes

Forward
Secrecy

Ownership
Transfer

Scalability
Assurance

Yes

External
Intervention

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

locations. This off site location has no connection with the central server. Normally truck drivers
are dispatched to the other companies to collect container deliveries. But it is a very usual case
that people employed in this job does not have the capability to ensure that the supplied
containers are the correct one that were ordered by his company. Moreover it is not possible to
check each container individually because obviously there are enormous numbers of containers.
As a result, containers being unchecked, sometimes wrong material are delivered to the
warehouse. This causes a loss for the particular manufacturing company. Now this problem can
be easily eliminated by using our serverless protocol provided that the containers are tagged
objects. The truck driver may have with him his personal PDA, which can act as a reader.
Reaching the offsite location this reader can easily authenticate the containers and find out
whether they are the ordered containers or not. This can be easily done as under our protocol, the
readers can authenticate and communicate with tags without the intervention of central server.
B. Environmental monitoring: The use of RFID systems in conjunction with highly
miniaturized sensors will make it possible to observe diverse environmental phenomena.
Environmental scientists perform diverse research on environment by attaching tags with animals
and releasing them in the wild again. These attached tags together with our serverless protocol
can help scientists on their research. Moreover, sometimes it becomes necessary to regain a
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tagged animal from the wild for research purpose. In this case our protocol can be very useful as
readers can track or locate the tagged animal in the wild without the need of server.
C. Authenticating smart objects usage at construction site: Several research groups
have been investigating applications of smart objects in outdoor working sites where regular tools
are augmented for supplementary services. For example, in [Kortuem07] construction drill
machines are augmented so that usage history can be monitored and usage safety can be ensured
by appropriate alerts. Such augmentations have direct implications in the business and logistic
processes of the companies since they use performance record of the workers. Our proposed
protocol can be applied to such scenarios to authenticate the workers to use the smart tools and to
enable secure logging of monitoring data locally which ensures their privacy.
3.9

Summary
In this chapter, we have suggested a serverless authentication protocol which ensures

mutual authentication of both the tag and the reader. Our authentication protocol is forward
secured and shielded against some major attacks, such as tracking, cloning, eavesdropping,
physical tampering, and DoS. Moreover, we have also proposed ownership transfer mechanism
which facilitates our protocol to be scalable. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
contribution in the literature that enables serverless protocol to perform ownership transfer. Our
plan is to devise a robust authentication protocol which will be able to synchronize a tag and its
legitimate reader even if the adversary desynchronizes them.
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Chapter 4: A Robust RFID Private Authentication Protocol
4.1

Introduction
RFID systems have been scrutinized nowadays as one of the emerging technologies in

pervasive environment. Authentication becomes indispensible in applications where security and
privacy are major concerns. Besides preventing some major attacks, RFID systems need to be
able to recover from unexpected conditions during operation.
Security and privacy aspects should be addressed before mass deployment of RFID tags
in omnipresent environment. However, conventional security solutions cannot be integrated in
RFID tags as they have inadequate computation capabilities with extremely limited resources.
Consequently, research community proposed several authentication protocols [Ahamed08A,
Conti07, Ohkubo03, Seo06A, and Tsudik06] that are secured against major attack models
including tracking, cloning, eavesdropping etc. But the complete removal denial of service (DoS)
attack is almost impossible. This attack causes conflict with the fundamental requirements such as
availability. An adversary can launch this attack in several strategies against RFID systems. For
instance, jamming the communication channels with noise can affect availability. However such
attacks can be detected and mitigated by mechanisms at the physical layer [Sharma03]. In this
chapter, we focus instead on the solutions to support availability at the protocol level (RFID
application layer).
The adversary can attack a tag with numerous queries from a rogue reader that is his
under control. As a result, the tag is not able to respond to any further query from the legitimate
reader. In other words, a genuine reader cannot communicate with his legitimate tags. A similar
attack is also possible on the reader launched by a rogue tag (controlled by the adversary). If the
reader has to spend a lot of time to verify each tag’s reply, this attack can keep the reader busy all
the time with some fake responses. If the adversary spends less time on generating those fake
responses, then the system will eventually be flawed.
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4.1.1 Desynchronizing attack
At the protocol level, another class of DoS attack can be possible. We term this attack as
desynchronizing attack. To provide strong authentication in an RFID system, the reader (or the
backend server) and the tag have to share secrets. For example, in a symmetric-key setting, both
the reader and the tag may share keys and other state information. But if the protocol has to
support privacy protection, the reader (or the backend server) must use some mutable information
(such as a changing pseudonym) to identify the tag in the absence of fixed identification values.
The dynamic information has to be synchronized between the reader and the tag to operate the
system successfully. In this scenario, the adversary can launch the desynchronizing attack by
breaking this synchronization. For example, due to the radio jamming of the channel between the
tag and the reader, a communication failure may happen, which may eventually result in
desynchronizing attack. Therefore RFID authentication protocols should at least figure out some
methods to detect this attack and recover the system if it is under attack.
DoS attack is not addressed by most of the authentication protocols because it is not
possible to cope with all kinds of DoS attacks. YA-TRAP [Tsudik06] is a famous authentication
protocol that places little burden on the backend server and uses monotonically increasing
timestamp which makes it secure against tracking but unsecure against DoS attack. Another a
hash chain based RFID identification protocol is RIPP-FS [Conti07]. Here Conti et al. proposed
that each tag shares a private symmetric key with the server. After each successful authentication,
both the tag and the server update the symmetric key to maintain synchronization. RIPP-FS is
resilient to a specific DoS attack where the adversary attempts to exhaust the hash chain. Another
lightweight protocol is OSK [Ohkubo03]. Ohkubo et al. proposed that only two hash function is
sufficient to provide indistinguishability and forward secrecy. But the problem of OSK is that a
malicious reader may easily desynchronize a tag which results in DoS attack. In [Ahamed08A],
we proposed two serverless authentication protocols. However, authentication protocol 2 (also
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presented in Chapter 3) is secured against almost all major attacks. But the major flaw of this
protocol lacks recovery support.
In this chapter, we propose a Robust RFID Private Authentication Protocol (Ripair) that
supports not only security and privacy, but also recovery in RFID systems. The protocol can get
back the desynchronized tags and readers to their normal state and thus provides robustness. This
protocol has been published in [Hoque09B].
4.2

System model
We consider an RFID system consisting of three components: tags, readers and a backend

server. The tag is a wireless transponder embedded in physical objects for detection and
prevention of product counterfeiting. The reader is a transceiver they can query tags for
identification of objects and/or subjects. To protect privacy all data of the tag that may be privacy
sensitive is stored in the backend server. Conversely each tag contains a limited amount of data to
prove his legitimacy to the backend server via the reader. The Reader not only interacts with the
tag but also communicates with backend server to identify the tag. The communication channel
between the reader and the backend server is assumed to be secured. For simplicity, we presume a
reader and the backend server to be a single entity and refer it as the reader. An issuer, another
entity of this model, initializes each tag by writing the necessary information into the tag’s
memory.
4.3

The robust RFID private authentication protocol (Ripair)
In this section we discuss our protocol. Before the description, we present the notations

and the assumptions for this protocol.
4.3.1 Notations and assumptions
Suppose  is the total number of tags in the system. Each tag contains a secret pair
consisting of a secret number  and an identifier . The tag gets this data from the issuer at the
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time of deployment. On the other hand, for each tag, the reader has a 3-tuple composed of the
secret number , the secret number of the last successful session  , and the tag identifier .
On the reader side, a tag  points to all the data associated with the respective tag. All the
entities of the system have the knowledge of a PRNG, (. ) that can generate pseudorandom
number based on its input (seed). In our case, this input (seed) will be the secret number  (or
sometimes  ). Both the reader and the tag also knows about the one way hash function ℎ(. ).
Initially, the data of the tag are in sync with the data of the reader, and  is equal to its
corresponding . We also assume that both the reader and the tag have capability of producing
random numbers that have the properties of a nonce. In other words, the reader and the tag can
produce nonce.
4.3.2 Protocol description
The protocol operates as shown in Figure 4.1. At first, the reader sends a request
accompanied by a random number  (nonce). Upon receiving the request, the tag computes )
with a self produced random number  (nonce). The tag replies with the ) for authenticating
itself. The  is attached with the response to help the reader to produce the same pseudorandom
number. Now the reader checks the validity of ) by computing   ⊕  ∥   for each tag in
the database. If the reader finds a match, it can be sure of the validity of the tag. To protect
privacy, the reader has to mutate the secret number. Therefore the reader updates  with the
current . To prove own legitimacy the reader has to generate his response that only the tag can
understand. The reader produces ) by using the next seed in the sequence that is the hashed
secret number ℎ(). Then the reader updates the seed with the next seed in the sequence (i.e.,
ℎ(ℎ())). If the reader fails to find any match in the first search strategy, he changes the scheme
of search by replacing the  with the  of each tag in the database. After a successful match,
the reader has to generates ) . In fact, this step of the protocol provides the system robustness to
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the desynchronizing attack. At this step the system recovers the tag that was desynchronized with
the reader by some malicious actions happened before. In both the cases, the reader replies with
the produced ) . If ) is not valid at all, the reader simply ignores the message and replies with a
random number R)1. However, this R)1 keeps the protocol consistent by preventing an
eavesdropper to acquire any knowledge (success or failure) about this session.
Reader
< ,  ,  >
Generate 

Use all the entries in the
database to generate
  ⊕  ∥   for all tags
and check validity of ) ,
if correct:
 ← ,
 ← ℎ(),
) ←   ⊕  ∥  ,
 ← ℎ();
if not correct:
generate
  ⊕  ∥  
for all tags and check ) ,
if correct:
) ←  ℎ( ) ⊕  ∥  ;
Otherwise:
ignore the message and
) ← R)1

2PQ2 , 
) , 

)

Tag
< ,  >
Generate 

) ←   ⊕  ∥  

 ← ℎ(), generate
  ⊕  ∥   and
check validity of ) ,
if correct:
 ← ℎ()

Figure 4.1: The robust RFID private authentication protocol

36

Finally, it is the tag’s turn to identify the reader by verifying the received ) . If the ) is
valid, the tag updates his secret number accordingly as shown in Figure 4.1. Otherwise the tag
discards the message.
4.4

Attack model
In this chapter, an adversary is denoted as ,5. The adversary can control a number of

readers and tags. Each reader and each tag controlled by the adversary is denoted as .dand d,
respectively. .d is unauthorized to have access to any real tags as it is not connected with the
backend server. Similarly, d is not valid as it has no idea about real  and real . We presume
that the backend server cannot be compromised otherwise the adversary would get total control
over the tag database then. We do not take for granted that the adversary has unlimited resources.
Instead we assume that all the entities such as tags, readers, adversaries, adversarial tags and
adversarial readers have polynomially bounded resources.
For this protocol, our assumptions also include that the goal of the adversary is not
confined to only forging a real tag and making the fake tag (and therewith the fake product)
indistinguishable from the real one. By hampering the availability (by applying desynchronizing
attack) the adversary can flawed the system. The adversary ,5 is simply more powerful than a
passive attacker. Like a passive attacker he can eavesdrop on the both the forward and backward
channels between a valid reader and a valid tag. However, like an active attacker, ,5 can install a
rogue reader .d that can communicate with a valid tag. In addition, the adversary can install a fake
tag d to communicate with a legitimate reader. In both cases the ultimate goal of the adversary is
to counterfeit a tag with the learned information. Despite of these attacks, the adversary can block
any channel at any time to fulfill his purpose. The adversary can launch the desynchronizing
attack by blocking (or jamming) any of the channels at any step of the protocol or by scrambling
any message passed from one party to another. In case of the protocol presented in Chapter 3, the
adversary can successfully desynchronized the tag and the reader, if he blocks the forward
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channel (from the reader to the tag) at line 15 (see section 3.3.2 or Figure 3.1) where the reader
sends a validation message to the tag. Denial-of-service attacks at the physical layer are out of
scope of this chapter.
4.5

Analysis of the protocol
In this section we analyze our proposed protocol. First we present how our protocol

provides robustness and recovers the desynchronized tags. Then we focus on security and privacy
analysis of the protocol.
4.5.1 Robustness analysis
In this section, we present a detailed example to explain how Ripair provides robustness.
After describing a successful tag query, we illustrate how a tag is recovered if the adversary
launches the desynchronizing attack in the earlier session. In our example, to make analysis
simple, we demonstrate the interaction between a single tag and the reader.
Reader

Tag

<  ,  ,  >

<  ,  >

Figure 4.2: Initial states

Initially, the reader and the tag are both in sync, as shown in Figure 4.2. Now the tag
responds to authenticate him upon receiving the request from the reader. Since the tag is valid, the
reader finds a match with an entry in the tag database. Now the reader generates  by using
ℎ( ). To prove himself valid, the reader replies with a valid ) . At the same time the reader also
updates the  and the  with the  (=ℎ( )) and the  , respectively. The tag also finds the
reader valid and updates his  from  to  according to the protocol. The subsequent states after
this successful session are depicted in Figure 4.3.
Now the adversary can break the synchronicity in final communication pass of the
protocol where the tag waits for ) from the reader. Suppose the aforementioned tag again
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interacts with the reader after a while. Every message but the final one, for instance, is effectively
received. The very last message containing ) is damaged or lost due to some malicious actions
of the adversary. Since the tag cannot update his secret number, he becomes desynchronized with
the real reader. The internal states of the reader and the tag after this unsuccessful session are
shown in Figure 4.4.
Reader

Tag

<  ,  ,  >

<  ,  >

Figure 4.3: States after the successful interaction

Now if this tag again comes to vicinity of the reader, the tag starts interaction with the
reader. However, the tag still has <  ,  > as his internal data. Now the reader fails to find any
match with the received response as he tries to validate with all the ’s in the database where the
 for this particular tag is | . On the contrary, the tag has used  to generate his response. The
reader further continues the search with the previous secret numbers,  ’s. Now the search will
be fruitful since the  for the particular tag is still  . Hence the reader concludes that the tag
is valid that was desynchronized in some earlier session.
Reader

Tag

< | ,  ,  >

<  ,  >

Figure 4.4: States after the unsuccessful session

To synchronize both the entities again, the reader takes a prominent step by sending the
valid message without doing any update in the database. When the tag receives this message, he
successfully verifies the originality of the reader and therewith updates the secret number (from
 to | ) as well. Thus the robust protocol recovers the system from out of order state. After
recovery, the states are shown in Figure 4.5.
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Reader

Tag

< | ,  ,  >

< | ,  >

Figure 4.5: State after recovery

4.5.2 Security and privacy analysis
In chapter 2, we have mentioned the six elements of safety ring which must be ensured
by an authentication protocol in order to keep an RFID system secured and protected. In this
section, we explain how Ripair defends the RFID system against those six major attacks and
keeps the system within the safety ring.
Privacy Protection: Users carrying various tagged items do not want to hamper their
privacy. If an adversary comes by any private information of the tag, by querying or
eavesdropping, he may cause several vulnerabilities to the owner’s day to day life. Our protocol
protects user’s privacy strongly. According to Ripair, a tag never sends his own  to anyone, not
even to the authorized reader. The tag sends his responses in disguise so that only an authorized
reader can identify the tag.
Prevent Tracking: If a tag replies with a constant response (e.g., plain ID or even
obfuscated message) each time he is queried, this constant response becomes a signature for the
particular tag. So the potential problem is that the adversary can establish a link between the
responses and the tag and therewith the owner of the tagged object which ultimately leads to
tracking. In order to prevent clandestine physical tracking, each entity’s response must be
scrambled. Our protocol is secured against such kind of tracking attack. In Ripair, each entity
replies with a distinct response in every session since random numbers ( and  ) are involved
within each computation of the validation messages () and ) ).
Prevent Cloning: To launch this attack, an active adversary queries a real tag and obtains
the response. By placing this response in a fake tag d, the adversary ,5 attempts to counterfeit the
real tag. Now the attacker becomes successful in his attempts if he can deceive a legitimate
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reader. In other words, the real reader fails to distinguish the genuine tag from the fake one.
According to Ripair, whenever an adversary ,5 queries a real tag, he receives a distinct response
each time because of the inclusion of random numbers in the response. Thus the protocol thwarts
tag counterfeiting.
Ensure Forward Secrecy: Forward secrecy means that an adversary will not be able to
realize any previous output transmitted by a entity even if he compromises the entity. Our
protocol ensures forward secrecy. The secret number , shared between the tag and the reader, is
updated each time using irreversible one way hash function ℎ(. ). After compromising a valid
entity (the reader or the tag), ,5 cannot realize the earlier responses by just learning the secret
number. Because those responses are based on the former secret numbers and he cannot derive
the former secret numbers from the current one.
Lessen Susceptibility to Replay Attack: In order to launch this attack, the adversary
eavesdrops on both the communication channels between the tag and the reader. Thus ,5 can learn
all the challenges and the responses between the legitimate tag and the legitimate reader, and later
uses these data to create a fake tag (reader) in order to deceive an honest reader (tag). But in order
to deceive a legitimate reader (tag), the fake tag d (fake reader .d) has to generate a valid
response. In case of our protocol, this is impossible since two distinct random numbers are
involved in each session. Therefore Ripair is not susceptible to replay attack.
Deal with Denial of Service: In this attack, the adversary wants neither to derive any
information nor to impersonate a tag or a reader. Rather the main target is to ensure that a valid
reader cannot access his authorized tags. To launch a DoS attack, ,5 can adopt several means.
Though it is not possible to cope with denial of service due to all possible ways, we focus on
some of those that our protocol can prevent. Jamming the channels may cause DoS. This problem
exacerbates when the backend server and the tag shares a secret key that has to be synchronized
after each regular query. Even distorted or damaged message may cause DoS. Certainly, our
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proposed protocol is vulnerable to above mentioned means. However, even after being
desynchronized, the protocol can recover the RFID tags to the normal state.
4.6

Summary
Widespread deployment of RFID systems depend on the strength of security against

major attacks, protection of private data, and recovery from unanticipated circumstances during
the operations. Each of the elements of the “Safety Ring” has to be ensured to keep the system
secured. In order to cope with these demands, we have presented a robust RFID private
authentication protocol (Ripair) in this chapter. How this protocol recovers the system has been
presented in the robustness analysis. In addition, security analysis establishes that the protocol
keeps the system secured by ensuring the safety ring. Study of other issues of DoS and making
the system more robust against those means are still open issues.
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Chapter 5: ERAP: An ECC Based RFID Authentication
Protocol
5.1

Introduction
Supply chain management can be referred to as a successful application of RFID

technology. It is an enabling technology that has the potential of helping the retailers to provide
the right product at the right place at the right time, thus maximizing sales and profit. RFID helps
to uniquely identify each container, pallet, case and item being manufactured, shipped and sold.
Thus RFID provides the building blocks for increased visibility throughout the supply chain.
Another important application of RFID systems is to detect counterfeit products. In
supply chain, product authentication provides great opportunity to find illicit trade and business
by identifying counterfeit products. Counterfeiting is a rapidly growing problem that affects a
great number of industries and harms societies in many ways. Therefore new technologies must
be put in place to prevent the counterfeit threat. And RFID technology has been identified as one
of the major anti-counterfeiting technology.
Anti-counterfeiting problem can also be rephrased as authentication problem. In order to
avoid counterfeiting, the adversary must not be able to clone any RFID tag. Moreover retrieving
the tag’s secret information by attacking the authentication protocol between the reader and the
tag has to be infeasible with respect to the resources of the adversary. Protection against cloning
at the physical level is achieved by using physical countermeasures [Tuyls06] and protection
against passive or active attack on the protocol level is provided by using cryptographic functions
such as secure authentication protocols.
Public key cryptography (PKC) offers an attractive solution to the counterfeiting
problem. But most of the previous works on RFID security consider only symmetric-key
algorithms such as AES [Feldhofer04]. But it is still not clear whether public key algorithms can
be implemented on small constrained devices such as RFID tags and can comply with memory,
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area, performance and power requirements for these applications. However in [Batina06A], the
authors investigate PKC based identification protocols that are useful for anti counterfeiting
applications.
In comparison with symmetric key based identification schemes, public key cryptography
is more flexible requiring no complicated pre-distributed key and pair wise key sharing
negotiation. The RSA algorithm is definitely the most popular in public key cryptography.
Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) is relatively a new family of public key algorithms that can
provide the same level of security with shorter key lengths. Depending upon the environment and
the application in which it is used, improved performance can be achieved.
It is a common belief in research community that public key cryptography (PKC), such as
RSA and ECC, is not practical because the required computational complexity is prohibitive for
the devices with limited computational capability and extremely constrained memory space. But
some recent progress in ECC and RSA implementation shows that public key cryptography is
feasible for small sensor devices and RFID tags. Recently a few papers [Tuyls06,
Wolkerstorfer05, Hein09] discuss the feasibility of ECC based PKC on RFID tags. Here we adopt
the belief that ECC based public key algorithms are feasible for RFID identification or
authentication. In this chapter, we propose an ECC based RFID authentication protocol (ERAP)
which is secure against some major passive and active attacks. Our proposed protocol is a mutual
offline authentication protocol which ensures that the tag and the reader authenticate each other
prior to any data exchange. Since it is a mutual authentication protocol, the tag releases own data
to only an authenticated reader and the reader can access only those tags for which the reader is
authorized. This protocol has been published in [Ahamed08B].
5.2

Technical preliminaries
Since our protocol is based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), we first focus on

some preliminaries of ECC.
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5.2.1 ECC preliminaries
The foundation of ECC based encryption-decryption scheme and digital signature scheme
is an elliptic curve (). The domain parameters of an elliptic curve scheme describe an elliptic
curve  defined over a finite field  .
Definition 1. A set  = (P, ., , R, , , ), ℎ) of domain parameters consists of:
1. The field size P.
2. . (field representation) is an indication of the representation used for the
elements of  .
3. If the elliptic curve is randomly generated in accordance with [ANSIX9.62], a
seed  is used. The seed length should be at least160 bits [Johnson01].
4. Two coefficients R,  ∈  define the equation of  over  .
5. A finite point  = ( , c ) ∈ ( ) where  , c ∈  .  has prime order and
is called base point.
6. The order ) of the point , with ) > 2

f

and ) > P.

7. The co-factor ℎ = #( )/). ◊
Detail descriptions of domain parameters are provided in [ANSIX9.62, Johnson01 and
Hankerson04]. There are security risks associated with multiple users sharing the same elliptic
curve domain parameters [ANSIX9.62]. Detail security considerations are described in the
standard X9.62 [ANSIX9.62].
Like any other public-key crypto, ECC is based on a key pair– a private key and a public
key. The private key is statistically unique and unpredictable integer 1 ∈ [1, ) − 1]. And the
corresponding public key is the scalar multiplication of 1 and , i.e., ¡ = 1. Thus the key pair
(¡, 1) is associated with the domain parameters  of the elliptic curve.
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5.2.2 System model
A model for our RFID authentication system has two direct components: tags  and
readers .. Tags are wireless transponder embedded in physical objects for detection and
prevention of product counterfeiting. Readers are transceivers— they can query tags for
identification of objects and/or subjects. A Certification Authority +, is an indirect party that is
trusted by all the tags and the readers. +, is also assumed not to be compromised. However, +,
is not mentioned as a direct component of our RFID system since an offline authentication
scheme requires no direct participation of a backend server. +,’s mere function is to deploy all
the tags as well as to authorize the readers. In other words, +, performs only at the time of the
deployment of the system. That’s why +, is not included as a direct component.
Since our protocol is based on ECC, each party (the +,, the tag and the reader) has to be
capable of performing calculation based on ECC. The certification authority generates the elliptic
curve domain parameters as well as the key pairs in accordance with X9.62 [ANSIX9.62]. To
thwart the attacks of an adversary and to enhance the system security, we propose to select a
unique elliptic curve for each RFID tag in the system.
Definition 2. A Certification Authority +,, the indispensable and indirect component of
the RFID system, is equipped with four algorithms:
1. A domain parameter generation algorithm that generates a set  of domain
parameters for each tag in the system. This algorithm randomly selects an elliptic
curve over  according to X9.62.
2. A domain parameter validation algorithm that checks the validity of the set 
before moving on to the next task.
3. A key generation algorithm that takes the set  as input and generates a key pair
(¡, 1), where 1 is the private key and ¡ is the corresponding public key. A key
pair is generated for each elliptic curve, i.e., for each tag.
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4. A public key validation algorithm that takes the set  and the associated public
key ¡ as inputs and checks the validity of ¡ for the given set of .◊
An RFID tag  is the smallest of all the components of our system. Each tag is capable of
performing elliptic curve computation along with modular computation. During the deployment,
each tag  receives a unique identifier , a unique set of domain parameters  and the
associated private key 1 from +, (see Figure 5.1(a)). The certification authority writes all the
data into the ROM (EEPROM) memory of the tag. These data are secret for each tag. We assume
that a tag never reveals these secret data to any reader, not even to any other tag of the system.
But the adversary is capable of learning these secret data by launching some hardware based
physical attack. But in this chapter, we do not consider any hardware based physical attack.
The other direct component of our system is the RFID reader .. Since a reader can
perform extensive computation than a tag, the reader has the major role in our authentication
protocol. During the deployment, each reader . receives a contact list ¢ from +, after .
authenticates itself to +, (see Figure 5.1(b)). The contact list contains the identifying information
of each tag  that . is authorized to access. We also assume that the communication between .
and +, is performed via a secure channel.
Definition 3. If a reader . is to be authorized to access a set of tags  ,  , … , £ , then
after authenticating to +, the reader . receives a contact list ¢ as follows:
¢ = G( , +2 )| is the identi@ier of  and
+2 is the certi@icate of  ; 1 ≤ / ≤ §}
where, a certificate +2 of the tag  is
+2 = G , ¡ | is the set of domain parameters of  ;
¡ is the public key of  } ◊

47

IDi

parameter Di

di

(a)

ID1

parameter D1

Q1

ID2

parameter D2

Q2

.
.
.
IDγ

parameter Dγ

Qγ

(b)

Figure 5.1: (a) Identifying and secret information of Tag nm received from o
(b) The contact list u of Reader l received from o

In our system, a certificate of a tag has the same content like ECC based public key
cryptography. In public key cryptography, the certificate of a party is available and easily
accessible to other party that wants to communicate with the former. But in our system, the
availability and the accessibility of a tag’s certificate are restricted. Here the certificate of a tag is
accessible only to the reader that has access to the tag.
5.2.3 Attack model
One of the goals of an adversary in any RFID system is to counterfeit a real tag such that
the fake tag can only be distinguished from the real one with small probability. Evidently, this
fake tag can let a fake product to be identified as a legitimate one just by attaching the fake tag to
the fake product. In ERAP, an adversary is denoted as ,5. The adversary can control a number of
readers and tags. Each reader and tag controlled by the adversary are denoted as .d and d,
respectively. .d is unauthorized to have access to any real tags as it has no information of the
contact list of the real reader .. Similarly, d is not valid as it does not have secret and identifying
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information of a valid tag. In addition, we assume that the adversary, the adversarial reader, and
the adversarial tag have polynomially bounded resources.
We assume that ,5 is more powerful than a passive attacker. In addition to eavesdropping
(like a passive attacker) on the both channels between a valid reader and a valid tag, the adversary
can install a rogue reader .d (like an active attacker) that can communicate with the valid tag.
Besides, the adversary can install a fake tag d to communicate with an legitimate reader. In both
cases the ultimate goal of the adversary is to counterfeit a tag with the learned information. In
addition, the adversary can launch physical attacks. However, the hardware based defenses
against physical attacks are beyond the scope of this chapter.
5.3

Details of ERAP
A mutual authentication protocol enables communicating parties (a reader and a tag) to

satisfy them mutually about each other’s identity. A challenge-response based protocol offers
both the parties (in our case, the reader and the tag) to generate a challenge for the other party to
respond to. Each party proves own legitimacy by sending the accurate response to the other party.
In an offline authentication protocol, the authentication is solely performed by a reader and a tag
without any direct involvement of the backend server (like the certification authority). ERAP is a
mutual challenge-response based offline authentication protocol. The protocol includes the
following set of algorithms and definitions:
1. ®¯ is a random number generated by the reader .. It is the challenge from the reader
to the tag .
2. ®3 is a random number generated by the tag . It is the challenge from the tag to the
reader.
3. ®¯ , ®3 < ) [Hankerson04], where ) is the order of the point  in ECC (see section
5.2.1).
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4. ProveTag:
ProveTag (³, j, ´l ) → (yn , hn ). This algorithm is executed by the tag . The
arguments are the domain parameter , the associated private key 1 and the
challenge ®¯ received from the reader .. The algorithm returns the tag’s response as
an ordered pair (3 ,

3)

that  transmits to ..

5. VerifyTag:
VerifyTag ³, ¶, (yn , hn ) → ·. The reader . executes this algorithm after receiving
the response (3 ,

3)

from the tag . It takes the domain parameters , the

corresponding public key ¡ and the received response (3 ,

3)

as input. It verifies

whether the response of the tag is accurate or not. This algorithm outputs ¸, where
¸ ∈ G,¹¹2º, .22¹I.
6. ProveReader:
ProveReader (³, ¶, ´n ) → (yl , hl ). This algorithm is executed by . to determine
the reader’s response (¯ ,

¯)

to the received challenge ®3 from the tag , given that

 is the set of domain parameters and ¡ is the corresponding public key.
7. VerifyReader:
VerifyReader (³, j, (yl , hl ))) → ·. This is analogous to VerifyTag(.) algorithm
except that it is executed by the tag upon receiving the response (¯ ,

¯)

from the

reader. The output of this algorithm is ¸, where ¸ ∈ {,¹¹2º, .22¹}.
The complete authentication scheme is presented in Figure 5.2. Since it is a mutual
authentication protocol, we will describe the protocol into two steps: one is “the tag authenticates
itself to the reader” and the other is “the reader authenticates itself to the tag”.
5.3.1 Step1:The tag authenticates itself to the reader
At the beginning of the protocol, the reader . generates a random number ®¯ and
transmits it as a challenge to the tag . Now it is the time for the tag to prove its identity. The tag
executes ProveTag(.) (see Figure 5.3) and replies to . with the response (3 ,

3 ).

In step 1, the reader . plays the role of the verifier. The reader executes VerifyTag(.) (see
Figure 5.4) to verify the received response from the tag. . accepts the tag  as valid if:
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∃, +2 ∈ ¢ such that
VerifyTag, ¡, (3 , 3 ) accepts the response.

Reader l

Tag n

Generate ®¯

(3 , 3 ) ∶= ProveTag(, 1, ®¯ )
Generate ®3

®¯
(3 ,

3 ), ®3

for each (, +2) ∈ ¢
¸ ∶= VerifyTag, ¡, (3 , 3 )
if ¸ = ,¹¹2º21 then
R½ / bR¾/1
(¯ , ¯ ) ∶= ProveReader(, ¡, ®3 )
else
R½ / )` bR¾/1
(¯ , ¯ ) ∶= (R)1 , R)1 )
(¯ ,

¯)

¸ ∶= VerifyReader, 1, (¯ ,
if ¸ = ,¹¹2º21 then
.2R12 / bR¾/1
else
.2R12 / )` bR¾/1

¯ )

Figure 5.2: Overview of the ERAP

Step 1 is based on Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA). In fact it is quite similar to Elliptic
Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA). A digital signature offers data integrity along with
authentication and non-repudiation. But our concern is the authentication feature of a digital
signature. In this way the prover (in step 1, the tag) can prove own identity to the verifier (in step
1, the reader). Here ProveTag(.) is the signature generation algorithm and VerifyTag(.) is the
signature verification algorithm. Though ProveTag(.) and VerifyTag(.) are quite similar to the
signature generation and verification algorithms of ECDSA, there are subtle dissimilarity. Instead
of the message digest [Hankerson04], both the algorithms use the challenge generated by the
reader. The proof that the verification algorithm works is given in section 5.3.3.
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Algorithm 1. ProveTag
Input: Domain Parameters  = P, ., , R, , , ), ℎ, private key 1
and a challenge ®¯
Output: Response 3 ,

3 ,

an ordered pair based on ®¯

1. Select a random integer  ∈ [1, ) − 1].
2. Compute  =  and convert the field element ¿ to integer À¿ .
3. Compute 3 = À¿ mod ). If 3 = 0, goto step 1.
4. Compute

3

5. Return (3 ,

=  Â (®¯ + 13 ) mod ). If

3

= 0, goto step 1.

3 ).

Figure 5.3: Algorithm 1 (ProveTag)

Algorithm 2. VerifyTag
Input: Domain Parameters  = (P, ., , R, , , ), ℎ), public key ¡
and received response (3 ,

3)

based on ®¯

Output: Acceptance or rejection of the response.
1. Verify that 3 ∈ [1, ) − 1] and

3

∈ [1, ) − 1].

If any verification fails, then
Return (Reject the response).
Â
3

2. Compute Ã =

mod ).

3. Compute Q = ®¯ Ã mod ) and Q = 3 Ã mod ).
4. Compute  = Q  + Q ¡.
If  = ∞, then
Return (Reject the response).
5. Convert ¿Å to integer À ¿Å and compute b = À ¿Å mod ).
6. If b = 3 , then Return (Accept the response);
Else Return (Reject the response).
Figure 5.4: Algorithm 2 (VerifyTag)
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5.3.2 Step2: The reader authenticates itself to the tag
During step 1, in addition to the response 3 ,

3 ,

the tag  sends a new challenge ®3 for

the reader .. Now it is the reader’s turn to prove itself to the tag. If the reader finds the validity of
the purported response of , the reader produces a response ¯ ,

¯

to be sent to the tag.

Otherwise . generates two different random numbers as the response. To generate a valid
response the reader executes ProveReader(. ) (see Figure 5.5) using the certificate of the tag. The
seed parameter  (see section 5.2.1) plays a significant role to generate the response. Its length
makes the response hard to be forged.
Upon receiving the response from the reader, the tag verifies (¯ ,

¯)

by using

VerifyReader(. ) (see Figure 5.6) to ascertain that the other entity is the legitimate reader. With
this step, ERAP terminates. In the step 2, the tag  does not have to search exhaustively. One
execution of VerifyReader(. ) is enough for  to figure out the validity of the reader.
5.3.3 Proof of the verification algorithms
Proof that ÆUWÇ^ÈÉXT(. ) works. If the response (3 ,
indeed generated by the legitimate tag, then we can get

3

3)

against the challenge ®¯ is

=  Â (®¯ + 13 )mod ). From the

equation we obtain,
≡

Â
3

(®¯ + 13 ) ≡

Â
3

®¯ +

Â
3

3 1

≡ Ã®¯ + Ã3 1
≡Q +Q 1

(mod ))

Now in VerifyTag(. ), a point  = Q  + Q ¡ is generated. If the reader is authorized to
access to the tag , then the reader’s contact list contains the valid  and the valid ¡ to generate
 . So
 = Q  + Q ¡ = (Q + Q 1) =  = 
and therefore b = 3 as required.
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Algorithm 3. ProveReader
Input: Domain Parameters  = P, ., , R, , , ), ℎ, public key ¡
and a challenge ®3
Output: Response ¯ ,

¯ ,

an ordered pair based on ®3

1. Select a random integer   ∈ [1, ) − 1].
2. Compute  =   ¡ and convert the field element ¿ to integer À¿ .
3. Compute ¯ = À¿ mod ). If ¯ = 0, goto step 1.
4. Compute

¯

5. Return (¯ ,

= 

Â

(®3 + ¯ )mod ). If

¯

= 0, goto step 1.

¯ ).

Figure 5.5: Algorithm 3 (ProveReader)

Algorithm 4. VerifyReader
Input: Domain Parameters  = (P, ., , R, , , ), ℎ), private key 1
and received response (¯ ,

¯)

based on ®3

Output: Acceptance or rejection of the response.
1. Verify that ¯ ∈ [1, ) − 1] and

¯

∈ [1, ) − 1].

If any verification fails, then
Return (Reject the response).
2. Compute Ã =

Â
¯

mod ).

3. Compute Q = ®3 Ã mod ) and Q = ¯ Ã mod ).
4. Compute  = (Q + Q )1.
If  = ∞, then
Return (Reject the response).
5. Convert ¿Å to integer À ¿Å and compute b = À ¿Å mod ).
6. If b = ¯ , then Return (Accept the response);
Else Return (Reject the response).
Figure 5.6: Algorithm 4 (VerifyReader)
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Proof that ÆUWÇ^ÈËUXÌUW.  works. If the response ¯ ,
certainly produced by the authorized reader, then

¯

= 

Â

¯

against the challenge ®3 is

®3 + ¯ mod ). From this

equation we obtain,
 ≡

Â
¯

(®3 + ¯ ) ≡ ¯Â ®3 + ¯Â ¯ 
≡ Ã®3 + Ã¯ 
(mod ))
≡Q +Q 

The tag  generates a point  = (Q + Q )1 according to VerifyReader(. ). Since the
tag has its own domain parameters and private key, we can say the point  is
 = (Q + Q )1 =   1 =   ¡ = 
and as a result b = ¯ , as required.
5.4

Security and privacy analysis of the protocol
In this section, we describe a number of attacks that an RFID system faces. This is

followed by the counter measures an RFID system should take. Then, we explain how ERAP
defends the system against these attacks. A legitimate reader and a legitimate tag are denoted by
. and , respectively.
Privacy protection. According to [Juels06], RFID gives rise to two major privacy
concerns: covert tracking and inventorying.
A. Tracking. As RFID tags respond to any reader’s challenges, tags can provide a ready
vehicle for tracking by responding with a constant reply, for example, a fixed serial number. This
privacy problem exacerbates when any personal information is combined with the tag’s serial
number. To prevent clandestine physical tracking, a tag’s response must be scrambled. Moreover,
the response must not carry any personal data.
The adversary ,5 can launch an attack to track the tag  by controlling a rogue reader .d.
This is an active attack initiated by ,5 to track . However, a passive attacker can even harvest
enough information by eavesdropping so that the attacker is able to track . If repeatedly
challenging  with a same value yields a consistent reply, then ,5 can distinguish the tag from
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other RFID tags since the consistent reply becomes a signature of . Therefore .d starts querying
 with a fixed ®¯ learned from any previous session of our protocol. But a random integer  used
in ProveTag(. ) makes the responses of  random to .d, even though .d reuses the same ®¯ . Thus,
ProveTag(. ) thwarts the physical tracking of a tag.
B. Inventorying. In some protocols, a tag’s response contains unique serial number as
well as the information of the product that the tag is attached to. People carrying such tags are
subject to secret inventorying. A rogue reader comes to know about the consumer’s personal
information. To protect the consumer’s interests, a protocol must ensure that the tag’s response
contains no product information. Moreover tags should reply in disguise so that only authorized
readers can identify them.
ERAP prevents secret inventorying attack since ERAP does not exploit any intrinsic
information, like the tag’s . Rather the protocol uses domain parameters, private and public
keys, and the challenges and responses between the tag and the reader. Thus, ERAP protects user
privacy.
Cloning. Now we consider the cloning attack launch by an active attacker. To perform
this attack, ,5 first queries the tag  and obtains a response from the tag. By writing this response
in a fake tag d, the adversary attempts to counterfeit the real tag. ,5 becomes successful in her
attempts if she can deceive a legitimate reader ., i.e. . fails to distinguish d from .
According to our protocol, whenever ,5 challenges the tag , she gets a different
response each time due to the random integer  in ProveTag(. ). Now suppose ,5 writes this
response in d. But d frustrates the adversary as it fails to fool the valid . because the adversary
cannot predict the challenge ®¯ that . will use to query the tag d. Therefore ,5 cannot obtain the
valid response from the valid tag at the time of counterfeiting . Hence we can say that ERAP is
secured against the cloning attack.
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Eavesdropping. So far we consider the active attacks that ,5 can launch in our RFID
system. Having the capability of a passive attacker, the adversary can eavesdrop on both the
channels between the reader and the tag. Therefore, ,5 learns the challenges and the responses
between . and , and later uses these learned data to launch any of the above mentioned attacks.
According to our protocol, ,5 cannot track  because  replies with a different response
each time it is queried, even if the same ®¯ is reused. Even ,5 fails to get any inventory
information as ERAP does not reveal any personal and/or product related information. Moreover,
ERAP prevents ,5 from launching a cloning attack by eavesdropping. Suppose the adversary tries
to impersonate the tag  with a fake tag d and she wants to fool an honest reader . with which 
has communicated recently. To deceive ., d has to generate a valid response. But since each time
. generates a new challenge ®¯ (not used before), so d fails to generate a valid response 3 ,


3 .

Therefore eavesdropping cannot help the adversary to attack the system.
Physical attack. Physical attack means ,5 compromises either the reader . or the tag .
We consider each case. Our assumptions include that once ,5 compromises . or , she learns
everything about the reader or the tag. However, here we do not address hardware based physical
attack in this chapter.
 compromises l. When ,5 compromises the reader, she gains access to the contact
A. 
list ¢ of the reader. Therefore, the adversarial reader .d can successfully impersonate . and
communicate with the tags that the reader . has access to. Suppose ¢ has the identifying
information of the tag  and ,5 wants to counterfeit  denoted as d. The adversary succeeds in her
attempt if d is able to fool another legitimate reader . that is also authorized to access . But
under our scheme, counterfeiting a tag and thereby deceiving a valid reader are possible if ,5
succeeds to recover the private key 1 of the tag by knowing the tag’s public key ¡. This problem
of recovering the private key with the knowledge of the public key is known as Elliptic Curve
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Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP) [ANSIX9.62]. Our adversary cannot be resolved the
problem because of the polynomially bounded resources. Therefore ,5 fails to counterfeit .
 compromises n. Whenever ,5 compromises , she learns about the domain
B. 
parameters  and the private key 1 of the tag. As a result, the adversarial tag d can effectively
impersonate the tag . Now with this information ,5 wants to clone another valid tag  and with
this cloned tag ,5 wants to cheat an honest reader . that is authorized to access  . Under our
protocol, knowing the  and 1 of the tag  does not help ,5 to clone  . Since the tag  receives
uniquely different domain parameters  and private key 1 from +,, ,5 cannot recover the
information of this tag  by compromising only . As a result, ,5 fails to create a fake tag to fool
the reader ..
5.5

Summary
In this chapter, we have presented an RFID authentication protocol which is entirely

based on Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC). It is a better choice than RSA because ECC can
provide security similar to RSA, but with shorter key lengths. Our proposed ECC based
authentication scheme can be used to solve product counterfeiting problem which has
experienced a steep increase in recent years. This protocol is a mutual authentication protocol
since it provides reader-to-tag and tag-to-reader authentication. According to security and privacy
analysis of this protocol, we can conclude that it ensures security and protects privacy of the
RFID system against common major attacks.
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Chapter 6: An Efficient Anonymous Private Authentication
Protocol
6.1

Introduction
RFID systems have been studied actively and frequently in pervasive computing

environments for last few years. The inherent capability of precise and reliable identification
attracts RFID systems in the area of tracking applications. This potentiality, however, can put
individual privacy at a risk. A threat to consumer privacy is one of the major obstacles in the
widespread deployment of RFID systems. A field trial of RFID embedded loyalty cards in Europe
was cancelled due to consumer protest over privacy concerns [Caspian04]. Strong authentication
can be a solution to the privacy problem. One party (prover) has to prove its own identity to
another party (verifier) in such way that an adversary can neither identify nor track the party
(prover). In this chapter we will consider only one way authentication where the tag has to
authenticate itself to the backend server via the reader. Here the tag is the prover and the reader is
the verifier. To address the privacy problem, the tag has to obfuscate its identity from
eavesdroppers in such a way that only the valid reader can understand and identify the tag.
Encrypting the tag’s message can protect its privacy. However, this technique cannot provide any
hint to the reader about the key that the tag is using to encrypt its message. Therefore the reader
has to search among a set of candidate keys until it finds the right key that correctly decrypts the
tag’s message. As a result, the reader becomes inefficient in terms of identifying a single tag since
it has to search a number of keys. This problem is exacerbated when the number of tags in the
system increases.
Several private authentication schemes proposed in [Juels07, Ohkubo03, and Weis03]
provide strong privacy at the cost of the search complexity on the reader’s side. Under these
protocols, the workload of the reader increases linearly with the number of tags in the system. In
other words, the search complexity is , where  is the total number of tags in the system.
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These approaches become infeasible in some applications, such as tracking each product at every
stage of supply chain management or automated display of flight information on smart tickets,
where there is a huge of number of tags in the system. Molnar and Wagner [Molnar04] first
proposed a tree based hash protocol for RFID systems to reduce the search complexity of the
reader from  to log Í ), where ¸ is the branching factor at each level of the tree. The tag
has to always perform log Í  encryptions for every authentication. However, for authenticating a
single tag, the worst case complexity of the reader is reduced to ¸ log Í . But this approach
achieves better scalability at the cost of some privacy loss of the tags [Nohl06]. Despite the
privacy loss, this protocol has been held in great consideration by the RFID community because
this is the first private authentication protocol that reduces the complexity of the reader. In fact,
this is the only protocol so far that can be practically deployed in large scale applications.
Therefore, improving the tradeoff between scalability and privacy of RFID systems has a great
significance in reality. In [Buttyan06], the authors proposed a modified version of the tree based
scheme where the branching factors are different at the different levels of the tree. This approach
improves privacy protection. The authors also propose an algorithm to determine the optimal key
tree for a given number of tags. Later Avoine et al. [Avoine07] proposed a group based private
authentication scheme that improves the tradeoff between scalability and privacy by dividing the
tags into a number of groups. The reader’s complexity is cut down to §, where § is the number of
groups in the system. In other words, the reader has to search through § keys to find out the
correct key. A benefit of this approach is that the tag has to perform only two encryptions for
every authentication. In addition, this approach provides significant improvement in privacy
protection. A serious limitation of this protocol is that whenever any tag is compromised (the
group key and the tag’s key become known to the adversary), all other tags of the same group
lose their complete privacy. The level of privacy provided by the scheme decreases as more and
more tags are compromised.
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In this chapter, we propose a group based anonymous private authentication protocol
(AnonPri) that provides higher level of privacy than the above mention group based scheme and
achieves better efficiency than the approaches that prompt the reader to perform an exhaustive
search.
6.2

Privacy in RFID Systems
So far several protocols have been proposed through which a tag obfuscates its identity

while authenticating itself to an authorized reader, so that the tag can protect its privacy (and
thereby consumer’s privacy) from a rogue reader. To provide strong privacy, these protocols
increase the complexity of the reader (some protocols increase the complexity of the tag, too).
Thus a tradeoff arises between privacy and scalability of RFID systems.
6.2.1 Privacy vs. Scalability
Ensuring strong privacy imposes a higher complexity on the reader. Conversely,
improving efficiency may hamper some privacy. In this chapter we focus on this major problem
of between privacy and scalability of RFID systems.
Public key cryptography would be a better candidate to solve the problem between
privacy and scalability. In this approach, the tag would encrypt its message using the public key
of the reader so that only the real reader would be able to decrypt the message and identify the
tag. But public key encryption is too expensive for low cost tags. In this chapter we consider the
low cost tags which are capable of doing symmetric key encryption, in which keys are shared
between the tag and the legitimate readers.
First, we outline how the tree based hash protocol provides scalability but sacrifice some
privacy. Then, we describe how the group based protocol provides improved scalability as well as
a higher level of privacy. Finally, we point out the privacy problem of this group based protocol.
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Tree based hash protocol. The tree based hash protocol proposed by Molnar and
Wagner [Molnar04] reduces the reader’s complexity from  to log Í ). Tags are
organized in a secret key tree where each tag is assigned to a leaf of the tree. Secret keys are
associated with each branch of the tree. Each tag (each leaf) receives all the secret keys along the
path from the root to itself. If the tree has ¢ levels, each tag stores ¢ keys. The authors [Molnar04]
proposed the key tree as a balanced tree. So if the branching factor is ¸, the log Í  will be equal
to ¢. Each tag has only one key that is not shared with any other tag of the system. Figure 6.1
shows a balanced key tree with  = 8 and ¸ = 2.
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k 2,1, 2
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k 2, 2, 2

T8

Figure 6.1: A secret key tree for the tree based hash protocol with Ï = Ð and · = k

According to this protocol, the reader queries a tag with a nonce ) . Upon the reception
of the nonce from the reader, the tag generates another nonce )Ñ and replies to the reader with
)Ñ , ℎÒÓ ∥ ) ∥ )Ñ , ℎÒÓ ,Òx ∥ ) ∥ )Ñ , … , ℎÒÓ ,Òx ,…,ÒÔ ∥ ) ∥ )Ñ ,
where each ¾ ∈ G1, … , ¸I, 1 ≤ / ≤ ¢, ℎ(. ) is a hash function and ∥ represents concatenation. The
nonce produced by the tag provides unlinkability between two consecutive responses from the
same tag. One the other side, the nonce from the reader prevents replay attacks. After receiving
the response, the reader first finds a match with the first hash value of the response by hashing
with all the keys of level 1. Whenever the reader obtains a match, the reader starts to search for
the second hash value of the response by hashing with all the keys at the next level of the sub-tree

62

rooted at the node where the reader has found the match. The reader repeats this step until it
reaches a leaf. Thus, the reader’s complexity is reduced to log Í ). In the worst case, the
reader has to search with all the ¸ keys at each level of the tree and therefore, the complexity
becomes ¸ log Í .
The major drawback of this approach is the loss of privacy if any tag is compromised by
the adversary. Since the tags share keys with some of the tags in the system, whenever a single
tag becomes compromised all the tags that share at least one key with the compromised tag have
to sacrifice their privacy. Suppose the tag e in Figure 6.1 becomes compromised. All the tags of
the system are partitioned into three disjoint sets. The adversary can now uniquely distinguish the
tag | and identify the tags  and  as a unique partition. All the remaining tags (~ , f , } ,  )
form a single partition because the tag e shares no key with them. Therefore each tag of this
partition (~ , f , } ,  ) is anonymous among these four tags. The privacy provided by this
scheme diminishes as more and more tags are compromised by the adversary.
Group based protocol. Avoine et al. [Avoine07] proposed a group based authentication
protocol to address the privacy problem of the tree based hash protocol. According to this
protocol, tags are divided into § disjoint groups of equal size. Each group is associated with a
unique key that we refer to as a group key. Every tag shares this group key with other members of
the given group. Additionally, each tag is assigned a unique key that is known only to the tag and
the reader. Figure 6.2 shows the group organization of the tags where  = 8 and § = 4. The  ’s
are the group keys, where 1 ≤ / ≤ §. The identifier of the th tag is represented by  (not shown
in Figure 6.2) and the unique secret key of the same tag is denoted as  34 , where 1 ≤  ≤ 8.
According to this protocol, the reader queries the tag with a nonce ) . The tag, then,
replies the following encrypted message (we assume that each tag has the knowledge of the
encryption algorithm) with the nonce )Ñ produced by the tag.
% ) ∥ )Ñ ∥   ∥ Ö () ∥ )Ñ ).
4
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Now the reader tries all the group keys to decrypt the first portion of the message. If the reader
finds the right key that correctly decrypts the message, then the reader can learn  and decrypt
the following portion of the response with the secret key of the tag  . Thus, the reader verifies
the tag’s legitimacy. This protocol reduces the complexity of both the reader and the tag. The tag
always has to perform two encryptions. In the worst case, the reader has to perform § + 1
encryptions. In addition, each tag needs to store only two keys for the authentication.
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Figure 6.2: The group organization of the tags for the group based authentication protocol, with
Ï = Ð and × = Ø

The group organization of this protocol improves the level of privacy. If any tag is
compromised by the adversary, then this compromised tag affects only the other members of its
group. After compromising the tag, the adversary learns the group key and the tag’s secret key.
Now the adversary can uniquely identify every single tag from the same group since the
adversary can discover each tag’s identifier by decrypting the first portion of the response from
each tag with the learned group key. All the remaining tags that belong to different groups form a
single partition so that the adversary cannot distinguish the tags that belong to this partition. For
instance, if the tag e is compromised, the adversary can uniquely identify only the tag | (see
Figure 6.2). The adversary cannot uniquely distinguish the other tags  ,  , ~ , f , } ,  . Each of
these tags remains anonymous among these six tags. This is definitely a significant improvement
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in privacy protection of RFID systems in comparison with the other protocols, including the tree
based hash protocol.
Like other protocols, this protocol also has some limitations. There is a tradeoff between
the number of groups and the group size. To reduce the complexity of the reader, the number of
groups has to be minimized. In this case, with larger group size, more tags will face the loss of
privacy if any tag becomes compromised. On the other hand, to keep the loss of privacy to a
minimum, the group size needs to be reduced, which eventually increases the reader’s
complexity. The loss of privacy increases for a system with large number of tags because to keep
the reader’s complexity moderate, tags have to be divided into groups of large size.
To address this problem, we propose an efficient anonymous private authentication
(AnonPri) scheme that improves the privacy protection by keeping the reader’s complexity
moderate. In our approach, each tag is assigned a couple of identifiers. A single tag shares some
of its identifiers with some members of its group. Thus this protocol prevents tracking by
increasing the uncertainty of the adversary.
6.2.2 Privacy characterization
In literature several different notions of privacy have been proposed so far. Some authors
mention information privacy as the privacy of RFID systems. This privacy notion is the act of
preventing a tag from disclosing its product information [Weis03, Ohkubo03]. But protecting
information privacy keeps tags traceable. Therefore it is a weak notion of RFID privacy. Some
define unlinkability as the strong notion of RFID privacy [Nohl06, Chatmon06]. Unlinkability
means the inability to distinguish between the responses from the same tag and the responses
from different tags of the system. Providing unlinkability ensures strong privacy when the
adversary cannot distinguish between two tags with a probability better than random guessing
[Juels07]. In our protocol, we protect privacy of the tags by providing unlinkability between two
tags of the system.
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The level of privacy obtained by any protocol can be measured using the anonymity set.
Anonymity has been proposed in the context of mix-nets in [Diaz02]. Mix-nets are used to make
the sender (and the recipient) of a message anonymous. The anonymity set is defined as the set of
all potential senders (recipients) of the message. Anonymity is defined as being not identifiable
among a group of entities, i.e., the members of the anonymity set. A higher degree of anonymity
is achieved with an anonymity set of larger size. Perfect anonymity is achieved if the anonymity
set contains all the members capable of sending (receiving) messages in the system.
6.3

System model
Our protocol is based on the group based scheme. Therefore, tags are divided into groups

of equal size. Suppose,  is the total number of tags in the system and Ù is the number of groups.
Ú

So, the group size is ) = Û . In this section, we define the components and parameters of our
system.
Issuer. The issuer initializes each tag during the deployment by writing the tag’s
information into its memory. The issuer also authorizes the reader access to the tags. Even each
group receives its unique group key and a pool of identifiers from the issuer.
Group. Each group has a ) number of tags. The issuer assigns a unique group key % to
the /th group  of the system. This key is shared between the members (tags) of this group. Each
group also receives the following pool of identifiers from the issuer
Ü = 9 , ,  , , … ,  ,Ý F,
where, 1 ≤ / ≤ Ù and Þ is a system parameter. The pools of any two groups do not share any
identifier, i.e., Ü ∩ Ü = ∅, ∀/ ≠ . Each tag of the group  is assigned a couple of identifiers
from Ü by the issuer.
Tag. All the tags of the system are divided into Ù groups. Each tag receives the shared
group key of the group that the tag belongs to, a unique secret key that is known only to the
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reader and the tag itself, and a set of identifiers from the pool of identifiers of the group. Suppose,
the tag  belongs to the group  . This tag possesses the group key % , the unique secret key
 34 , and a set of identifiers Ω  . Each key is of ã bits, where ã is the security parameter of
symmetric key encryption. We define the Ω  as follows
Ω  = 9 ,Ó ,  ,x , … ,  ,ä F,
where
• each  ,å is chosen randomly following uniform distribution from the pool Ü and
 ∈ G1,2, … , Þ}, where 1 ≤  ≤ æ
•  ,å ≠  ,ç , for all  ≠ c
• æ is also a system parameter and Þ > æ.
The identifiers are assigned to the tags in such a way that at least one identifier of a tag is
shared with at least two other members of the same group. Therefore, we can say for the tag  ,
∃º, Pè ,å ∈ é  ∩ é  ê,
where º,P are any two members of  and º ≠ P.
Reader. The reader is connected to the backend server. In this chapter, we assume the
communication channel between the reader and the backend server is secured. From now on, we
denote the backend server as the reader. In our system, the tag is the prover and the reader is the
verifier. The reader receives all the secret information by the issuer during the deployment. The
issuer issues the reader a set of secret information for each group in the system
ë = 9ì% , í îï1 ≤ / ≤ ÙF, where % is the secret group key and í is the mapping of the
identifiers of the pool Ü with the secret keys of tags. Formally,
í = 9ì , , ð îï1 ≤  ≤ Þ and  , ∈ Ü F,
where ð is the set of secret keys of tags associated with the  , . ð can be defined as an empty
set if no tag is associated with the  , or it can be a set of size at least one. Formally,
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9 ,  , … F, where ô∗ ∈ G ,  , … , Ú Iõ
ð = ñ òÓ òx
.
∅,
otherwise
System parameters. Since each tag receives æ identifiers randomly chosen from the
pool of Þ identifiers, according to the  distribution strategy, we can say that each tag has at
least one identifier common with at least two group members. The probability that each tag shares
at least one identifier with at least two group members is
ùúä
ä 

ö÷ø = 1 − [

ù

ä

×

ùúxä
ä 
ù

ä

ý

(ÝÂ")!

] = 1 − (Ý!)x (ÝÂe")!, where Þ ≥ )æ.

For example, we consider an RFID system of 1000 tags divided in 10 groups. 100 tags
are in each group. For simplicity, we assume Þ = 100 and æ = 10. Then the probability that each
tag shares at least one identifier with at least two group members is ö÷ø = 96.87%.
6.4

Our protocol: AnonPri
In this section, we describe our protocol. The reader starts to query the tag with a nonce

) . Upon the reception of the query, the tag generates another nonce )Ñ . Suppose the reader
interrogates the tag  . In the second step, the tag picks an identifier, say  ,å , from Ω  . Then

the tag computes  as shown in Figure 6.3. Here,  (. ) denotes symmetric key encryption with

key . The tag replies with the . Now the reader searches all the group keys until it finds the
correct one that properly decrypts the first part (Q) of the response. If the reader retrieves the

identifier  ,å that the tag used in its response, then the reader tries to decrypt the second part
(b) of  with the potential set of secret keys (ð ) associated with  ,å . After finding the right

secret key, the reader can uniquely identify the tag  . Sharing some identifiers of a tag with other
members of the group provide unlinkability even if any tag is compromised by the adversary. We
will discuss this in section 6.7.
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Reader l
Generate nonce, )

1. . tries all the group keys
until it decrypts Q to retrieve
the  ,å

Tag n
)



1. Generate nonce )Ñ
2. Pick a  ,å from Ω 
3.Q ←  ) ∥ )Ñ ∥  ,å ,
%
b ← Ö ) ∥ )Ñ , and
 ← Q, b
4

2. . lookups the key set ð
associated with the  ,å

3. . tries all the keys  ∈ ð
until it decrypts b.

4. If such a key exists, .
accepts  ,otherwise rejects 
Figure 6.3: The efficient anonymous private authentication protocol

6.5

Attack model
One of the major goals of an adversary in any RFID system is to infringe the tags’

privacy by means of tracking. In this chapter, an adversary is denoted as ,5. We assume ,5 as an
active adversary who has full control over all the communications between the tag and the reader.
She can not only eavesdrop, but also intercept, modify and even initiate authentication session.
The adversary can, for example, impersonate a tag and communicate with the valid reader. Even
the adversary can query a valid tag and learn the tag’s response. Our assumptions also include
that the adversary can control a number of readers and tags. Each reader and tag controlled by the
adversary are denoted as .d and d, respectively. .d is unauthorized to have access to any real tags
since .d has no secret information like the real reader .. Similarly, d is not valid as it does not
have the secret and identifying information of a valid tag. However, the adversarial reader .d can
communicate with a valid tag. Even the fake tag d can communicate with a legitimate reader. In
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both cases, the ultimate goal of the adversary is to track any tag of the RFID system. We assume
that the adversary, the adversarial reader, and the adversarial tag have polynomially bounded
resources. In addition, the adversary can launch physical attacks. However, the hardware based
defenses against physical attacks are beyond the scope of this chapter. Our assumptions for this
chapter also include that the reader cannot be compromised.
6.6

Privacy model
At the end of the protocol description, we mention that this protocol provide unlinkability

and thereby preserves privacy. The adversary cannot link the responses with the tags, even if she
can decrypt the first portion of the response and learn the identifier that the tags are using to
produce the response. Like Juels and Weis [Juels07], we use an experiment based definitions to
formalize RFID privacy. We conclude that the adversary cannot break unlinkability or invade
privacy with probability better than random guessing. The following oracle-like construction
exists:

  is an oracle that randomly chooses some tags from all the  tags of the system.

7Ñ takes a tag  as an input. Given the nonce ) , the group key  , the secret key

 3 and the set of identifiers Ω, the oracle randomly selects an  ∈ Ω, generates another nonce

and finally produces the response  = Q, b. It outputs the cipher text .

 is an oracle that, provided with a tag , queries the tag and outputs the received

response .

Ò  is an oracle that, provided with two tags  ,  , randomly chooses  ∈ G0,1} and

queries the tag  using  . Then it outputs the response  .
6.6.1 Information privacy against ,5

Given a tag , the set of identifiers Ω stored on , and an identifier , an adversary can
break the information privacy of our protocol if she can guess whether the tag  is using the .
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Moreover, ã is the security parameter and  ∈ ℕ is the maximum number of time the adversary

can query the tag . In addition, since the oracles of our privacy model are random, the inputs are
computationally intractable from the outputs of the oracles.
Experiment Exp d

 

[ã, ]

1. Setup: The issuer initializes the  tags of the system with their corresponding unique
secret keys, the group keys, and the sets of identifiers after dividing the tags into Ù
groups. It shares all the secret information with only the reader.

2. Learning:   provides the adversary with a challenged tag  that the adversary

queries  times and appends each response  to the list ¢ (initially ¢ is an empty list).

3. Guess: Now the adversary transmits the tag  to the oracle 7Ñ with a nonce
and receives a response  from the oracle. The adversary selects an identifier .

Given the list of  responses in ¢, ,5 outputs 1 if she guesses that  is produced using
, and 0 otherwise. ,5 is successful if her guess is right.

Definition 1. AnonPri is said to preserve information privacy with security parameter ã
and º`¾cã representing any polynomial function of ã, if
 
∀,5, PrèExp d [ã, ] succeedsê ≤

1
1
+
.
2 º`¾cã

6.6.2 Unlinkability against ,5
The adversary should not be able to distinguish between the two responses from the same
tag.
7
Experiment Exp7Ò
[ã, ]
d

1. Setup: The issuer initializes the  tags of the system with their corresponding unique
secret keys, the group keys, and the sets of identifiers after dividing the tags into Ù
groups. It shares all the secret information with only the reader.
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2. Learning:   provides the adversary with two challenged tags  ,  from the

same group. The adversary queries each tag  times and appends each response  , 
to the list ¢ (initially ¢ is an empty list).

3. Guess: The adversary transmits  ,  to the oracle Ò  . ,5 receives the response 
from Ò  . Given the list of responses ¢ and the response  , the adversary guesses

the value of b. ,5 succeeds if her guess is right.

Definition 2. AnonPri is said to provide unlinkability with security parameter ã and
º`¾cã representing any polynomial function of ã, if
7
[ã, ] succeedsê ≤
∀,5, PrèExp7Ò
d

6.7

1
1
+
.
2 º`¾cã

Security and privacy analysis
In this section, we formally prove that our protocol preserves data privacy and provides

unlinkability. In addition, we analyze the preservation of privacy in some attack scenarios where
some of the tags of the system are compromised by the adversary ,5.
6.7.1 Information privacy
Theorem 1. AnonPri preserves information privacy with respect to the adversary ,5.

Proof. Let us assume   provides the adversary ,5 with a tag . ,5 transmits this tag to

the oracle 7Ñ with a nonce ) . Then 7Ñ provides ,5 with the response .

Now, ,5 selects a . To break data privacy, ,5 should tell if is produced using the .

This implies that ,5 has to identify the input of the encryption by just learning the cipher text. ,5
can succeed in two cases. First, if she can retrieve the inputs from the output of the random
oracle. But this contradicts with our assumption that the inputs of a random oracle are

computationally intractable from the output of the oracle. Second, if ,5 knows the secret keys of
the tag . Without tampering the tag , if ,5 can determine the keys by learning the cipher texts,
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this again breaks the semantic security of the symmetric key cryptography. Therefore ,5 can break
data privacy with probability no better than random guessing. Thus it proves data privacy

∎

property of Definition 1.
6.7.2 Unlinkability
Theorem 2. AnonPri provides unlinkability with respect to the adversary ,5.

Proof. Let us assume   provides the adversary ,5 with two tags  ,  from the same

group. These two tags go into the learning phase. ,5 transmits  ,  to Ò  which outputs the
response  .

Now, to break unlinkability, the adversary ,5 has to tell the value of . We assume that

the adversary’s guess is right. In other words, the adversary can determine whether the response

 is produced by  or  , given the learned responses from both the tags. The responses of a tag
cannot be a signature of the tag because according to our protocol, a nonce on the tag side makes
each response different from all the previous responses originated from the same tag. Therefore,
we can say that the guess is right because the adversary knows the keys (the group key and the
secret key) stored on these two tags. Without tampering the tags  ,  , the adversary has to
determine the keys stored on these tags by just observing the cipher texts. But this contradicts
with the semantic security of symmetric key cryptography. Therefore the adversary can break
unlinkability with no better approach than random guessing. Thus it proves the unlinkability
property of Definition 2.

∎

6.7.3 Physical attack
Under this attack, we consider that the adversary ,5 can compromise any tag with a
probability of Ú. Whenever a tag  becomes compromised, the adversary learns all private

information stored on the tag  . Therefore, the adversary can now decrypt Q of each response 
originated from the other members of the group  . Thus, ,5 can learn the identifier that a tag is
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using to produce its response by decrypting the Q. We discuss the aftereffect of this attack with an
example and demonstrate how AnonPri provides unlinkability even if the adversary realizes the
identifiers used in the responses.

3,5,9,10

2,3,5,6

T2

T1
2,5,8,12

T4
Anonymity set 3

1,2,3,4

T3
Figure 6.4: Aftereffect of a physical attack on AnonPri, where n is compromised by the adversary

We consider a group  of four tags  ,  , e , and | . Suppose the adversary
compromised the tag e as shown in Figure 6.4. Now the adversary learns the group key % , the
tag secret key  3ý and a set of identifiers Ωe = G1,2,3,4}. From now on, the adversary can decrypt
Q part of all the responses originated from  ,  , and | with the group key % . But, the
adversary still cannot decrypt b part of these responses since she does not possess the secret keys
of these tags. With this learned information (% and Ωe ), the adversary tries to track the other
tags of this group. Since the adversary can decrypt Q of each responses, she can learn the
identifier underlying the cipher text Q. In other words, she can discover which identifier has been
used to produce a response. The arrow in the Figure 6.4 represents that the responses of the
authentication sessions (after e is compromised) are transmitted from the tags ( ,  , | ) to the
reader. The identifiers used in these responses are shown on above the arrow. Each identifier is

shown in plaintext since the adversary can retrieve the identifier by decrypting Q of  using % .
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According to our protocol, even if the adversary comes to know about the identifier used
in a response, she cannot conclude which of the potential tags is the sender of this response. In
our example, the adversary discovers the identifier 2 is used two times, but she cannot be certain
which of these tags ( ,  , | ) is the originator(s) of these responses. Though e shares the
identifier 2 with only  and | , however, the adversary has no knowledge about the parties with
whom e is sharing which of its identifiers. Even the adversary does not know how many of the
identifiers of Ωe are being shared. So, under this scenario, the anonymity set of the potential
senders of a given response seems to be 3 to the adversary. Therefore, when the adversary
compromises one tag from the group of ) uncorrupted tags, AnonPri forms an anonymity set of
size 1 and another anonymity set of size () − 1) from the group instead of ) anonymity sets of
size 1 like the group based authentication [Avoine07]. This is the noticeable partition that
improves the level of privacy provided by AnonPri. Because, the remaining  − ) tags of the
system forms the other anonymity set which is same under both the protocols. Thus AnonPri
prevents the adversary to gain any benefit for tracking by compromising a tag.
We now consider the case of compromising multiple tags of the same group. In the above
scenario, even if ,5 compromises either  or | after compromising e , the adversary cannot be
certain whether  has identifier 2 in Ω or not. Therefore, the size of anonymity set is still 2, i.e.,
) − ¹, where ¹ is the number of compromised tags of the group. If ,5 compromises  instead of
 or | , the size of anonymity set is still 2 (i.e., ) − ¹). Therefore, we conclude that the
anonymity set, formed from a group that is under physical attack, is of size () − ¹), where ) is
the group size and ¹ is the number of compromised tags of the given group.
AnonPri provides protocol-level privacy only. In real world, there are many possible side
channels. If tags emit distinct “radio-fingerprint”, then no protocol-level privacy countermeasures
can prevent privacy infringement [Avoine05].

75

6.8

Measurement of privacy
In this section, we measure the level of privacy achieved by AnonPri as a function of the

total number of compromised tags. We consider two privacy metrics for the measurement of
privacy. First, our privacy measurement technique is based on anonymity set like the privacy
metric used by Avoine et al. [Avoine07]. Second, we identify the amount of information
disclosed by a scheme as another metric presented in [Nohl06]. This metric is based on
Shannon’s information theorem [Shannon48].
6.8.1 Measurement of privacy based on anonymity set
The level of privacy of an RFID system, achieved by a scheme, at a given time, is a
function of the total number of compromised tags at that time. When some tags are compromised,
the set of all tags are partitioned such that the adversary cannot distinguish the tags belong to the
same partition, but she can distinguish the tags that belong to different partitions. Therefore, these
partitions become the anonymity sets of their members. The level of privacy based on anonymity
set, ℘, can be measured as the average anonymity set size [Avoine07].
℘=

| |
1
1
| |
=
| |




where | | denotes the size of partition  and

|¿% |
|Ú|

is the probability that a randomly chosen tag

belongs to partition  .
According to AnonPri, a similar kind of partitions is formed when tags become
compromised. If ¹ is the number of compromised tags within group  , then the set of the tags
within this group is partitioned into ¹ anonymity sets of size 1 and another anonymity set of size

) − ¹ . If ℂ = G¹ |¹ is the total compromised tags within  } is the set of compromised

groups, |ℂ| is the total number of compromised groups, and + = ∑ø÷ % ∈ℂ ¹ is the total number

of compromised tags, the level of privacy ℘ achieved by AnonPri can be expressed as
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℘=

1
)Ù − |ℂ| +


 ¹ + ) − ¹  

each % ∈ℂ

where
•

 = total number of tags in the system

•

) = total number of tags within a group

•

Ù = total number of groups in the system.

6.8.2 Measurement of privacy based on information leakage
We measure the information leakage in bits based on Shannon’s information theorem
[Shannon48]. If we have a group of tags of size  and the adversary divides this group into two
disjoint subgroups of size /2, then 1 bit of information is disclosed out of log  bits. Extending


this concept from two subgroups of equal size to two subgroups of different sizes, where ø tags
are in one subgroup and the remaining tags 1 − ø  are in another subgroup, we can measure
the average amount of information disclosed in bits as follows
=

R−1
R
1
log (R) +
log 
.
R−1
R
R

In general, if the adversary splits  tags of the system into  disjoint partitions, then


=


| |

∙ log [ ]
| |


where | | denotes the size of partition  .

According to our protocol, if ℂ = G¹ |¹ is the total compromised tags within  } is the set

of compromised groups, |ℂ| is the total number of compromised groups, and + = ∑ø÷ % ∈ℂ ¹ is
the total number of compromised tags, the amount of information leakage in bits  can be

expressed as
=


)Ù − |ℂ|
log [
] +

)(Ù − |ℂ|



 % ∈ℂ

() − ¹ )
1

log [
]
¹ [ log ] +
() − ¹ )
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where
•

 = total number of tags in the system

•

) = total number of tags within a group

•

Ù = total number of groups in the system.

6.8.3 Experimental results
We have compared both the protocols, AnonPri and the group based authentication, using
a Matlab simulation. The experiment results establish that the level of privacy provided by
AnonPri is higher than that of the group based authentication. Our comparison is based on the
two metrics presented above, the level of privacy (based on anonymity set) and information
leakage. We have come up with a conclusion same as [Nohl06] that the information leakage
describes the privacy threats better than the anonymity set.
In our simulation, we have considered two systems with  = 2 f , Ù = 64 and  =

2 , Ù = 64. Tags are selected to be compromised with a uniform random distribution. The

number of compromised tags ranges from 0 to 160. We have run the simulation for 100 times and

computed the average ℘ achieved by AnonPri and the group based authentication as a function of

the total number of compromised tags + (see Figure 6.5 (a)-(b)). The small increase in the level of

privacy achieved by AnonPri is visible when the total number of compromised tags becomes
more than 30.
During the simulation, we have also computed the average amount of information
leakage , for both the protocols, as a function of the total number of compromised tags + (see
Figure 6.5 (c)-(d)). The plots depict that a significant amount of improvement in privacy
protection is achieved by AnonPri. With the increase in the total number of compromised tags +,
the average amount of information disclosed by the group based authentication is quite higher
than the information disclosed by AnonPri. In Figure 6.5(c) ( = 2 f , when + becomes 160, the
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(a) Level of privacy based on anonymity set, with
 = 2 f and Ù = 64

(c) The amount of information leakage, with  = 2
Ù = 64

f

(b) Level of privacy based on anonymity set, with
 = 2 and Ù = 64

and

(d) The amount of information leakage, with  = 2
Ù = 64

and

Figure 6.5: Experimental results of AnonPri against the group based authentication

group based authentication discloses about 15 bits out of 16 bits of information, while AnonPri
discloses about 6 bits of information. The group based authentication discloses 56.25% more
information than AnonPri in a similar setup. Figure 6.5(d) ( = 2 ) shows that the group based
authentication reveals almost 19 bits out of 20 bits of information and AnonPri reveals around 6
bits of information. This time the group based authentication discloses 65% more information
than AnonPri. Based on the simulation results, we can conclude that the information disclosed by
the group based authentication increases with the size of the system; however, AnonPri shows
consistency in the information leakage in both the cases.
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Information leakage is a better metric to demonstrate the privacy threats in RFID systems

than anonymity set. Though the improvement in ℘ provided by AnonPri against the group based
authentication is not significant, however, we can say that AnonPri provides better privacy

protection than the group based authentication, based on the results of the amount of information
disclosed by these two protocols.
6.9

Discussion
In this section, we discuss the limitations of AnonPri.
Search complexity. According to AnonPri, the reader’s complexity is slightly increased

than the group based scheme [Avoin07]. After receiving the response  = Q, b from a tag  ,
the reader searches for the correct group key to decrypt Q. In the worst case, the reader has to

perform this operation Ù times. If such a group key exists, the reader can retrieve the identifier
 ,å from Q. Now, the reader has to search for the tag’s secret key to identify  by decrypting b
properly. The reader searches a key space of size |ð |. Therefore, in the worst case, the reader’s
total complexity is Ù + |ð |. In the best case, the size of ð is 3 and in the worst case, it can be ),
size of the group. But in the group based scheme, the reader’s complexity in worst case is Ù + 1.
Nevertheless, AnonPri is much better than the other schemes where the worst case reader’s
complexity is , the number of total tags in the system. To provide improvement in privacy
protection, we have to sacrifice this small increase in the complexity of the reader. Since readers
are more powerful than tags, they can handle this increase in search complexity.
Memory complexity. According to AnonPri, tags need to store æ number of identifiers
along with the group key and the unique secret key. Though tags have limited resources,
however, the increase in memory requirement is acceptable than the increase in computation and
communication complexity. A smart RFID tags have memory capacity of 32kBytes or more
[Laurie07]. Even RFID tags with extended memory capacity are available at the market
[Fujitsu08]. All these tags can store the information required for AnonPri.
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6.10 Summary
RFID systems will be welcomed for many applications if the system can guarantee
consumer privacy as well as improve scalability. To address the tradeoff between privacy and
scalability, we have proposed an efficient anonymous private authentication protocol (AnonPri)
in this chapter. We have presented a brief comparison between the tree based hash protocol and
the group based authentication for RFID systems. Then we have presented a privacy definition
that an RFID system should consider. A detail security and privacy analysis of AnonPri
establishes that AnonPri preserves information privacy as well as unlinkability. In addition,
AnonPri provides higher level of privacy than the group based scheme when some of the tags are
compromised by the adversary. However, according to AnonPri, the reader faces a slight increase
in the search complexity, which is much better than performing linear search in the database to
identify a single tag. Finally, we can say that AnonPri is suitable for many applications where
privacy violation is a major point-of-failure.
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Chapter 7: Conclusions and Future Work
In this chapter, we summarize the contribution of this thesis and present some future
research directions.
7.1

Conclusions
In this thesis, we focus on private authentication protocols to protect privacy and ensure

security of RFID systems. The research achievements of this thesis are as follows:
In chapter 2, we have identified six security and privacy requirements of an RFID system.
We have also presented how these requirements form the safety ring. These requirements are the
real need that an RFID system must achieved before deployment. If any of the six requirements is
not fulfilled by an RFID system, then the system will be at a risk of privacy violation and/or
security attacks. Later in this chapter, we have assessed some significant RFID authentication
protocols based on symmetric key cryptography against the safety ring. Since some recent
publications provide evidence about the feasibility of public key cryptography (e.g., Elliptic
Curve Cryptography (ECC)) implementation on RFID tags, we have briefly discussed and made
reference to those articles for interested readers.
In chapter 3, we have proposed a lightweight serverless authentication protocol for
typical RFID tags that can perform simple symmetric key operations. This protocol makes use of
pseudo random number generator (PRNG) and one way hash function to provide the security and
privacy requirements of RFID systems. Since this protocol is serverless, the system is no longer
vulnerable to the single point-of-failure. We have presented the security and privacy analysis of
the protocol with respect to our proposed attack model. We have assessed the cost of this protocol
in terms of storage, computation and communication. Two additional features of this protocol,
ownership transfer and scalability, are presented in this chapter. We have explained how the
current owner (a reader) of a tag can transfer the ownership information to a new owner (another
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reader). Finally, we have compared this protocol with some significant RFID authentication
protocols based on the identified security and privacy requirements.
In chapter 4, we have defined the desynchronizing attack on RFID systems. We have
proposed a robust private authentication protocol for RFID systems that not only supports
recovery of the disabled tags but also protects privacy and prevents security attacks. We have,
then, exemplified how this protocol recovers an RFID system that is under the desynchronizing
attack. Later we have analyzed this protocol against our identified security and privacy
requirements.
In chapter 5, we have presented that anti-counterfeiting is one of major needs for the
widespread development of RFID systems. To address the counterfeiting problem, we have
proposed authentication protocol which is entirely based on Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC).
Though ECC is a class of public key cryptography, however, this protocol does not publicly share
the public key of a tag. This protocol is a mutual authentication protocol as it provides reader-totag and tag-to-reader authentication. We have analyzed how this protocol is secure against
common major attacks with respect to our proposed attack model.
In chapter 6, we have presented the tradeoff between scalability and privacy of RFID
systems. We have explained two significant solutions to this problem – tree based hash protocols
and group based authentication. We have, then, analyzed the limitations of these protocols. We
have characterized the RFID privacy and proposed an efficient anonymous authentication
protocol for RFID systems. A privacy model for RFID systems based on random oracles has been
proposed in this chapter. Later we have analyzed and formally proved that our protocol protects
the privacy of RFID tags. Finally we have described the reader’s complexity and the tag’s
memory complexity of this protocol.
7.2

Future work
In this section, we present some future research directions in RFID security and privacy.
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•

Ensuring perfect privacy protection results in an RFID system with poor
scalability. On the other hand, to achieve better scalability, an RFID system has
to sacrifice some privacy. This tradeoff should be studied further for the
development of better solutions that can ensure perfect privacy protection as well
as better scalability.

•

In this thesis, we consider the communication channel between a reader and the
server is secure. However, this channel is also subject to security attacks.
Ensuring secure communication over this channel can be a new research
direction.

•

In chapter 3, we have presented a technique for ownership transfer where reader
to reader communication is required. We have considered that readers can
communicate with other readers through a secure channel. Authentication over
this channel can be fruitful topic.

•

Some authentication protocols have recently been proposed based on public key
cryptography. A further study on this area can be productive for some good
solutions to RFID security and privacy problems.
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Appendix A
Glossary of terms
Term

Definition

RFID

Radio Frequency IDentification is the use of a wireless
transponder embedded into objects for automatic
identification and tracking of assets, animals and/or
persons.

RFID tag

An RFID tag is an identification device which usually has
an identifier and which transmits data wirelessly using
radio frequency (RF) in response to interrogation by an
RFID reader

RFID reader

An RFID reader is a transceiver that interrogates and read
data from tags by broadcasting an RF signal using its
antenna.

Backend server/ central server/
backend database

A backend server can retrieve the detailed information of a
tag from its database by using the tag’s response as a key.

Security

Techniques that control who may use or modify the
computer system or the information contained in it

Privacy

The notion of controlling where, when, to whom and what
amount of information is provided to the external entities

Identification

In RFID systems, identification means the act of retrieving
the identity of tags.

Authentication

Authentication means the act of confirming someone (or
something) as authentic.

Mutual authentication

Mutual authentication is the act of proving one party’s
identity to the other communicating party and vice versa.

Private authentication

Private authentication is the act of proving one party’s
identity to the other communicating party using shared
secrets (e.g., cryptographic keys, seeds of PRNG)

Symmetric key cryptography

A class of algorithms for cryptography that use shared
secret cryptographic keys

Public key cryptography

A class of algorithms for cryptography that use a pair
cryptographic key: public key (known to public) and
private key (known only to the owner).

